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WHO has well-developed guidance for the 
development of health financing policy, 
which supports progress towards universal 
health coverage (UHC) and overall health 
system goals. Most recently, a series of 
health financing guiding principles have 
been proposed, based around the different 
functions of health financing policy (Kutzin 
et al., 2017; McIntyre and Kutzin, 2016). The 
key messages in these guidance documents 
centre heavily on the importance of public 
finances, and the role of government in using 
those finances in the best way to strengthen 
their health system and maximise progress 
towards UHC.
Fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) 
present a growing challenge for achieving 
UHC and other developmental goals. In this 
paper, we examine core features of FCAS 
settings, which centre on deficits in capacity, 
legitimacy and security, and what this implies 
for health systems, but more specifically for 
health financing and in relation to the key 
messages and policy guidance currently 
offered by WHO. We explore common health 
financing constraints and opportunities and 
how policies have responded to these. These 
are summarised in Table 1. 
Our data analysis has shown that, as 
would be expected, FCAS countries have 
significantly higher out of pocket expenditure, 
external dependency and health-related 
impoverishment. They also have lower mean 
government expenditure on health in relation 
to wider government expenditure and total 
health expenditure. However, much of this 
is driven by the tendency of FCAS to be low 
income; when stratified, there are fewer clear 
differences at low income levels, whereas 
external dependence and impoverishment 
remain significantly higher for upper-middle 
income FCAS, perhaps indicating the effects 
of shocks. 
Conflict-affected countries within the FCAS 
grouping show similar patterns but more 
accentuated, with less external support and 
lower overall expenditure on health. Chronic 
FCAS countries (those in this category for 
more than five years) showed similar patterns 
to the wider group. 
Trends analysis shows some improvement 
in FCAS performance on health financing 
indicators over recent years, but from 
generally lower starting points and with 
regional variations. In terms of UHC coverage, 
FCAS have lower performance for all income 
levels. 
There are substantial challenges for health 
financing in FCAS settings but considerable 
ingenuity has also been shown in addressing 
them, albeit often externally driven. It is also 
important to highlight that many models 
have been developed and road-tested in FCAS 
settings – approaches such as performance-
based contracting and PBF emerged to a 
large extent out of the need to innovate in 
FCAS and have since been applied in wider 
contexts. The literature highlights that crises 
often lead to innovation, and that innovations 
can leave a longer legacy (the issue of path 
dependency), which reinforces the need to 
use crises well.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ix 
Table 1:	Summary	of	common	health	financing	challenges,	responses	and	gaps	in	FCAS	settings
Health financing function Summary of common challenges in FCAS 
settings
Strategies adopted to 
mitigate these (and gaps)
Revenue raising and pooling
Aims:
Increase	flows	from	public	and	
mandatory	sources	
Increase	predictability	and	
stability	of	funds
Enhance	redistribution	of	
prepaid funds
Ensure	that	funding	sources	
are	complementary
Reduce	fragmentation,	
duplication	and	overlaps
Simplify	financial	flows
–	 	Public	funding	is	often	low	(low	GDP	growth;	low	
taxation;	non-prioritisation	of	social	sectors)
–	 	May	be	multiple	authorities	collecting	revenues	
–	 	Limited	territorial	control	reduces	government	
revenue base 
–	 	Conflict	additionally	tends	to	depress	health	
expenditure	(2%/year,	according	to	one	study),	
while	raising	needs	(disrupted	services,	displaced	
populations	etc.)
–	 	High	dependence	on	external	funding	(donors,	
charities,	remittances).	Problems	relating	to	this	
include	instability;	lack	of	predictability;	and	
lack	of	alignment	with	public	priorities	(e.g.	high	
volumes	off-budget	and	off-plan)
–	 	External	support	is	very	varied	by	country;	
relative	to	stable	countries,	donors	preferred	
to	provide	more	funding	to	low-income	fragile	
countries	that	have	refugees	or	on-going	
external intervention but tended to avoid 
providing	funding	to	countries	with	political	
gridlock,	flawed	elections,	or	economic	decline.
–	 	FCAS	associated	with	higher	external	finance	for	
MICs,	not	LICs	(compared	to	non-FCAS	LMICs)
–	 	External	finance	can	be	too	low	for	needs,	while	
also	being	high	relative	to	absorptive	capacity	
(especially	if	there	is	a	post-crisis	funding	influx),	
leading	to	low	disbursement
–	 	High	levels	of	out	of	pocket	payments,	in	
contexts	where	household	incomes	are	often	low	
and	subject	to	shocks,	with	high	levels	of	health	
need 
–	 	Low	overall	funding,	though	can	in	cases	be	high	
but	poorly	distributed
–	 	Low	trust	undermines	pooling	–	leads	to	lower	
levels	of	prepayment;	more	fragmented	risk	
pools 
–	 	Segmented	population,	especially	where	
there	are	substantial	refugee	and	displaced	
populations	having	varying	protection
–  Aid pooling and 
coordination	mechanisms,	
including	shadow	alignment
–	 	Policies	to	increase	financial	
access	and	decrease	out	of	
pocket	payments,	including:	
user	fee	exemptions,	
health	equity	funds,	health	
insurance,	demand	side	
financing
–	 	Greater	use	of	cash,	card-
based	and	mobile	payments	
in	humanitarian	settings
Gaps: 
–	 	more	attention	could	be	
paid	to	ensuring	stable,	
predictable	revenues,	
including	use	of	revenue	
from	extractives	and	
sin	taxes,	as	well	as	
remittances,	but	challenge	
is	to	increase	tax	equitably
–	 	how	to	harmonise/integrate	
different	strategies	to	
increase	access,	including	
across	humanitarian	and	
development	programmes,	
and during transitions 
between	them
–	 	Assumption	of	decreasing	
financial	dependency	post-
shock	not	well	studied;	
dependency	is	also	more	
than	just	financial
Purchasing
Aims:
Increase	the	extent	to	which	
the	allocation	of	resources	
to	providers	is	linked	to	
population	health	needs,	
information on provider 
performance,	or	a	combination
Move	away	from	the	extremes	
of	either	rigid,	input-based	line	
item	budgets	or	completely	
unmanaged	fee-for-service	
reimbursement
Manage	expenditure	growth,	
for	example	by	avoiding	
open-ended	commitments	
in	provider	payment	
arrangements
Move	towards	a	unified	data	
platform	on	patient	activity,	
even	if	there	are	multiple	
health	financing	/	health	
coverage	schemes
–	 	Multiple	(uncoordinated	and	unaligned)	
purchasers	(with	households	often	dominant)
–  Data on and assessment of population needs 
and	provider	performance	is	limited	and	often	
fragmented
–	 	Fee	for	service	payment	dominates	in	private,	
informal	sectors;	public	sector	commonly	a	mix	
of	fixed	(under-funded)	budgets	and	user	fees;	
various	forms	of	contracting	in	humanitarian	
sector	
–	 	Where	there	is	lack	of	confidence	in	government	
by	donors,	funding	is	often	channelled	to	(I)
NGOs,	leading	to	patchy	provision	and	often	
higher	costs	(inefficient	provision)
–	 	Data	on	payments	and	outcomes	not	unified	or	
linked
–	 	Complex	remuneration	and	weak	regulation	
undermines	accountability	of	providers
–	 	Contracting	and	
performance-based	
contracting,	often	with	
NGOs
–	 	Performance-based	
financing	in	both	fragile	but	
relatively	stable	as	well	as	
humanitarian	contexts.
Gaps:
–	 	Overall	purchasing	
assessments	and	how	
to defragment it and 
improve	its	performance,	
also	working	across	
humanitarian	and	
development silos
–	 	Development	of	context-
specific	regulatory	models	
for	different	sectors
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Table 1: Contd.
Health financing function Summary of common challenges in FCAS 
settings
Strategies adopted to 
mitigate these (and gaps)
Benefits packages
Aims:
Clarify	the	population’s	legal	
entitlements and obligations 
Improve	the	population’s	
awareness	of	both	their	
legal	entitlements	and	their	
obligations	as	beneficiaries
Align	promised	benefits,	or	
entitlements,	with	provider	
payment	mechanisms
–	 	Entitlements	often	unclear	and	not	linked	to	
funding
–	 	Population	awareness	of	entitlements	is	low	
–	 	Well	defined	health	care	packages	are	often	
missing,	meaning	care	seeking	can	be	irrational
–	 	Fragmented	funding	influences	service	provision	
–	e.g.	vertical	programmes	can	give	resourcing	
preference	to	some	disease	areas	
–	 	Service	provison	capacity	may	be	disrupted,	with	
patchy	coverage	and	low	quality	of	care
–	 	Parallel	provision	for	refugees	in	many	settings	
and	challenges	transitioning	away	from	this
–  Development and 
implementation of essential 
health	care	packages
Gaps:
–	 	More	work	is	needed	on	
quality	of	care	in	FCAS	
settings 
–	 	Dynamic	costing	of	
packages	to	allow	for	
changing	contexts
–  Greater integration of 
humanitarian	purchasing	
and provision
UHC objectives –	 	Resources	captured;	not	flowing	to	populations	with	highest	need
–	 	Gaps	in	critical	resources	can	make	even	limited	resource	inefficient	(e.g.	public	
budgets	often	focussed	on	salaries,	leaving	lack	of	funds	for	drugs,	outreach,	
supplies,	supervision,	especially	for	frontline	PHC	services)
–	 	Non-priority	care	can	gain	bulk	of	resources	(e.g.	prevention	and	lower	cost,	more	
equitable	services	neglected)
–	 	Governance	and	reporting	weak:	limited	transparency	and	accountability,	often	
exacerbated	by	external	dependence
UHC goals –	 	Financial	and	non-financial	barriers:	inequitable	access
–	 	Underconsumption	of	care	by	poor	and	marginalised,	exacerbated	by	physical	
access	barriers,	especially	with	shifting	populations	&	in	slum	areas
–	 	Catastrophic	payments,	especially	for	chronic	illness	
–	 	Regressive	financing	of	health	care,	especially	when	out	of	pocket	payments	
predominate
–	 	Quality	of	care	often	poorly	regulated	and	can	be	low	
Other cross-cutting –	 	Weak	public	financial	management	systems	contribute	to	many	of	the	challenges	
above,	and	are	also	themselves	undermined	by	plethora	of	aid	funding	channels
–	 	Health	financing	institutions	have	low	capacity,	which	is	hard	to	build	in	a	context	
of	chronic	or	intermittent	shocks
–	 	Conflict	and	institutional	weakness	can	block	systemic	reforms,	although	there	
is	also	some	evidence	for	windows	of	opportunity	opening	post-crisis	(in	some	
circumstances)
In drawing conclusions, it is important to 
highlight the heterogeneity of FCAS settings 
and the need to focus on each context 
as unique, with its particular challenges, 
opportunities and history. While there 
are some shared features, our analysis of 
overall datasets demonstrates the variation 
in performance on most health financing 
indicators, and also that many FCAS countries 
share features with low income countries 
generally. 
Given this, the guiding principles for health 
financing reforms in support of universal 
health coverage (Kutzin et al., 2017) still 
apply in FCAS settings – in fact, even more so, 
given the greater severity of the challenges 
that they often face, such as fragmentation, 
complexity and volatility of funds, for 
example. However, their operationalization 
may need to be different and achieving them 
may take a longer or more staged journey – 
for example, moving from unregulated fees 
for service to flat fees (i.e. a fixed amount 
for the entirety of a health service provided, 
rather than an itemized bill/payment), to 
increase predictability of payments, before 
gradually shifting more systematically away 
xi 
from out of pocket payments for core health 
services. Similarly, in some settings donors 
may be unable to work through government 
but can move toward better coordination 
with government to avoid fragmentation 
and service gaps. Within Ministries, the 
development of project implementation units 
with semi-autonomy is arguably another such 
transitional mechanism, aiming to fill short 
term capacity gaps while offering a route to 
their longer term strengthening.
Given the regional nature of many conflicts 
and shocks, health financing analysis and 
support may be needed at regional level – 
for example in the EMRO region, where all 
countries are either directly or indirectly 
affected by conflict – as well as at national 
and sub-national levels. The focus should 
be on tailored strategies, which build 
on international learning but are closely 
contextualised and able to adapt. The only 
certainty is change, and building capacity to 
manage change is critical. 
Although FCAS settings go through different 
phases, such as pre-crisis, reacting to crisis, 
stabilisation and recovery, many now face 
chronic problems and complex emergencies, 
in which strategies for humanitarian 
response and development converge. Lessons 
on contracting health care provision and 
insurance models are just some examples of 
areas where this convergence is occurring 
and can be further pursued. This is important 
to managing transitions.
Important messages emerging from this 
review include the following:
  All FCAS settings have health financing 
challenges but those which combine 
deficits in security, capacity and 
legitimacy are most extreme and require 
support which is adaptable, long term and 
politically astute.
  Political economy considerations are 
important in all settings but FCAS often 
require particular sensitivity, given the 
underlying factors fuelling fragility, and 
typically include a larger role for external 
actors. 
  Strategies in these areas need to be 
based on understanding the internal and 
external agency incentives, looking for 
politically feasible improvements, even 
where not optimal, and enabling work 
across politically contested areas.
  Many of the health financing challenges 
are linked to this configuration, 
with external actors adding to the 
fragmentation of policies and practices 
in many cases – hence the importance of 
coordination, even if direct relationships 
with governments are constrained.
  In some of these settings (e.g. acute 
crises or gradual collapse of functions), 
appropriate goals for health financing 
may be not so much advancing UHC but 
preventing loss of gains – for example, 
preventing a reversal of financial 
protection as budgets collapse and out of 
pocket payments replace them. 
  Support needs to be tailored to regional, 
national and sub-national levels, including 
for specific vulnerable populations, such 
as refugees and other displaced people, 
who typically have higher health needs 
(such as mental health) and may have 
more limited entitlements and access.
  In chronic emergency settings where 
wider institutional structures exist, 
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humanitarian and development assistance 
should aim to pool risks (e.g. through local 
risk-sharing schemes e.g. a social health 
insurance) and provide service coverage 
(e.g. through purchasing contracts 
with relevant providers) through these 
structures as far as possible, investing 
in longer term institutional capacity 
and avoiding parallel systems. During 
acute crises, this may not possible but 
even in these settings distortions can be 
minimised.
  Recognising the importance of stable 
funding flows, more advocacy is needed 
for continued, predictable and (where 
possible) integrated external funding, 
with external partners refocusing their 
aid and support on those in most need 
globally.
  Further pooling of donor support, 
including harmonizing financial 
management, human resource and other 
procedures across donors, implementing 
agencies and districts, including through 
shadow alignment where needed, is 
recommended.
  Given higher levels of resource scarcity in 
many FCAS settings, coupled with high 
need, there is an even higher need than 
usual to focus resources on priority services 
(focused on vulnerable populations, with 
cost-effective services). The development 
of essential service packages is common 
in FCAS settings and can form the basis 
for pooled funding by government and 
donors.
  In the context of underlying economic 
and social challenges, displacement and 
conflict and other crises, households’ 
ability to access and pay for health care 
is typically reduced in FCAS settings, 
and attention to reducing financial and 
non-financial barriers is key; reports 
of reintroduction of fees in response 
to dwindling external support are 
concerning as populations are already 
bearing too high a burden in terms of out-
of-pocket payments. 
  The consensus on removing user fees in 
humanitarian crises is important in this 
context, but there are risks of difficult 
transitions when areas or populations 
emerge from acute crises, leading to loss 
of financial protection, coverage and 
health. Policies to extend protection and 
smooth transitions are important.
  There is an increased focus on cash 
transfers in general in development, 
however in the health sector conditional 
cash transfers need to be combined with 
well-designed provider payments so 
that quality of care and appropriate care 
packages are offered (focused on those 
in need but also emphasising preventive 
health and public health measures). 
Unconditional cash transfers are more 
suited to addressing demand-side barriers, 
such as transport.
  Given the high likelihood of shocks, it 
is important to learn from the resilience 
literature on distributed capacity and plan 
health financing systems accordingly. 
Being better prepared for crisis may 
also include, for example, having basic 
packages established and costed, with 
draft contracts, so that governments 
and donors can react more quickly to 
shocks of various kinds; also having 
simple but functional systems for tracking 
expenditures and resource flows in the 
health system in place.
1Background
BACKGROUND
Fragility and conflict present a critical 
development challenge, affecting, eroding 
and hampering efforts to build healthy and 
prosperous societies. According to the World 
Bank (2018), two billion people now live in 
situations affected by fragility and conflict. 
The share of extreme poor living in conflict-
affected situations is expected to rise from 
17% of the global total today to almost 80% 
by 2030 if no action is taken (OECD, 2018). 
This is fuelled by growing inequality and the 
proliferation of acute and chronic conflicts, 
resulting in population displacement and 
systems breakdown, which spread risks across 
whole regions. Today’s refugee population is 
the highest on record (UNHCR, 2017). More 
than 60% of maternal and child deaths occur 
in FCAS (OECD, 2018).
A recent study found that armed conflict 
substantially and persistently increases 
infant mortality in Africa, with effect sizes 
on a scale with malnutrition and several 
times greater than existing estimates of 
the mortality burden of conflict (Wagner et 
al., 2018). However, fragile states receive 
around 50% less aid than predicted, despite 
their high needs (Graves et al., 2015). In 
this context, making progress towards 
universal health coverage and meeting the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is 
particularly challenging, but essential also in 
light of linkages with broader issues, such as 
state-building and stabilisation (Kruk et al., 
2010a) and the global health security agenda 
(Ghebreyesus, 2018; Ooms, 2017).
Improving health financing systems is critical 
to enable countries to raise more resources 
for health and make good choices about how 
to use them. However, the evidence of what 
works in these circumstances is limited. There 
is no clear guidance on how to translate and 
apply the existing lessons and principles on 
health financing for universal health coverage 
to fragile situations. 
Against this backdrop, this paper1 aims to 
highlight the health financing challenges 
specific to these contexts and refine existing 
thinking and advice on health financing 
policy, contributing to the development of 
more effective and contextualised health 
financing policy-making and technical 
support at national and regional levels.
IMPLICATIONS OF FCAS FOR 
THE HEALTH SECTOR
There is no single agreed definition of FCAS2, 
but common elements across the definitions 
used include a focus on gaps in relation to 
three dimensions:
1.  Government’s capacity and willingness 
to provide basic services to its population 
(especially vulnerable groups).
2.  Its legitimacy.
3.  Its ability to provide security and stability 
(survival functions) (Witter et al., 2015).
1  Annex 1 presents further information on how the paper 
was developed, including the experts’ consultation and the 
methodological approach for the literature review and the 
data analysis components.
2  See Annex 2 for a discussion on this, and Annex 3 for the 
FCAS list used for the purposes of this document.
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It is clear that settings where government 
institutions are incapable of or unwilling to 
provide basic services, legitimacy and security 
face particular set of challenges when it comes 
to health and health care systems (Witter and 
Hunter, 2017a).
NEED AND DEMAND
Fragility and crises are often accompanied by 
falls in employment, and the reduced ability 
of people to pay for health care is compounded 
by decreased government income and a drop 
in government spending on health (Witter 
and Hunter, 2017a). Conflict-affected settings 
in particular may experience the destruction 
of health facilities, disruption of systems 
processes, such as procurement and health 
information, and the emigration or deaths of 
health workers (Ager et al., 2105; Pavignani 
and Colombo, 2009). Any destruction or 
militarisation of transport infrastructure 
further exacerbates problems for ensuring 
geographical coverage of health services.
While coping with the loss of available 
resources, people in crisis-affected settings 
must also cope with rapidly changing burdens 
of disease. These include injuries and illnesses 
associated with violence, reduced food 
availability, resurgent infectious diseases, 
population movements, the mental health 
problems that accompany crises, as well as 
the burden of chronic disease that is growing 
worldwide (Spiegel et al., 2010). Governments 
are thus expected to do more with less, and it 
is health workers who bear the brunt of those 
pressures. These problems are compounded 
by reduced legitimacy of the state if the state 
is perceived by some societal groups to be 
ineffective or unresponsive (Whaites, 2008; 
Witter and Hunter, 2017b). This can further 
reduce state capacity to collect taxes and 
insurance contributions to fund the health 
system. Likewise crises may undermine social 
cohesion and lead to exclusion of particular 
social groups from the health system based 
on their ethnicity or religion (Pearson, 2010).
SUPPLY
In fragile states, the health system building 
blocks are by definition weak and incomplete 
(Eldon et al., 2008). Characteristics include 
(Newbrander et al., 2011)
  inability to provide health services to a 
large proportion of the population outside 
urban areas;
  ineffective or non-existent referral 
systems for the critically ill;
  a lack of infrastructure (including 
facilities, human resources, equipment 
and supplies, and medicines) for delivering 
health services—what did exist has been 
destroyed or severely compromised due to 
war and/or neglect;
  non-existent or inadequate capacity-
building mechanisms and systems, such 
as national clinical training programmes, 
to address the dearth of clinical and 
management capacity;
  insufficient coordination, oversight and 
monitoring of health services by the 
emerging government, which may not 
have the capacity to manage;
  lack of equity in who receives the available 
health services: few public health services 
exist for the poor and in rural areas;
  lack of policy mechanisms for developing, 
establishing and implementing national 
health policies;
  non-operational health information 
systems for planning, management and 
disease surveillance; and
  inadequate management capacity and 
systems (such as budgeting, accounting 
and human resource management 
systems) for controlling resources.
3Background
A growing body of work on the impact of 
conflict and crisis on the health workforce 
exists (Witter and Hunter, 2017c), highlighting 
the gaps, distortions and fragmentation of 
policies which typify FCAS settings, and 
draws out lessons for short and longer term 
HRH policies (Witter et al., 2016a).
A higher degree of aid dependence and 
complexity of aid partnerships are also typical 
features of FCAS settings, raising risks and 
opportunities for external actors which are 
summarised in Box 1.
Experimentation and innovation are 
encouraged by stressors. The ensuing 
achievements are not always recognised, 
or capitalised on. “Health outcomes across 
different sites within a given country are 
variable, indicating that some sites have found 
ways, or ‘workarounds’, to overcome health 
systems challenges to deliver high quality 
services – so called ‘positive deviants’” (GFATM, 
2015). They can inspire other operators, but 
cannot be mechanically ‘replicated’ because 
they remain context-dependent.
The	group	of	countries	and	regions	classified	as	Challenging	Operating	Environments	(COEs)	are	very	
varied,	both	across	 the	group	and	 internally.	Additionally,	healthcare	arenas	change	quickly	under	
stress,	demanding	the	frequent	revisiting	of	both	analysis	and	interventions.	However,	some	traits	
are	more	common	in	COEs	compared	with	more	stable	settings.
1.	 	Health	systems	result	from	multiple	adaptations	to	stress,	spontaneous	as	well	as	 intentional,	
increasingly	diverging	from	designed	structures	and	processes	as	the	crisis	deepens	and	persists.	
As	a	consequence,	official	policy	documents	may	become	irrelevant,	and	misleading	as	guidance	
for	external	participants.
2.	 	The	informalisation	and	commoditisation	of	largely	privatised	service	delivery	processes	become	
the	defining	features	of	these	health	systems,	which	are	crowded	with	a	variety	of	autonomous	
actors.	 Intervening	 in	 isolation	 is	 therefore	 fruitless.	Attributing	progress	or	 failure	 to	 specific	
actors	or	actions	is	often	impractical.
3.	 	The	 inequitable,	 inefficient	and	uneven	delivery	of	poor-quality	care	becomes	the	norm.	Once	
entrenched	after	decades	of	disarray,	this	state	of	affairs	is	resistant	to	correction.	But	also	the	
challenges	encountered	by	aid	agencies	are	of	uneven	intensity,	with	peripheral	health	structures	
found	sometimes	more	responsive	than	the	central	level.
4.	 	Governments	are	frequently	contested,	and	state	administrations	mistrusted.	Recognised	health	
authorities	 lose	 clout	 and	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 process,	while	 competitors	 for	 control,	 credibility,	
funding	and	operational	reach	may	emerge.	
5.	 	Trans-border	 linkages	 may	 connect	 distressed	 health	 systems,	 as	 people,	 funds,	 medicines,	
germs	and	ideas	move	between	and	within	countries.	Actual	boundaries	may	move	or	disappear.	
Resilience	 and	 sustainability	 acquire	 a	 cosmopolitan	 dimension	 too,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	
rebound	of	Ebola-stricken	Liberia	buoyed	by	the	vast	global	support	enjoyed	by	it.
6.	 	These	healthcare	arenas	are	fluid	and	fuzzy,	due	to	volatile	conditions	as	well	as	shaky	information	
and	defective	 intelligence.	Stable	areas	 coexist	with	others	 in	 turmoil.	No	stakeholder	holds	a	
clear	understanding	of	the	whole	picture.	Additional	analytical	efforts	are	required	to	obtain	valid	
insights.
Source: (Witter and Pavignani, 2016)
Box 1: Health	systems	in	Challenging	Operating	Environments	
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Health financing and its core functions 
(Figure 1) directly impact on Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC), which aspires to utilisation 
of quality health care for all, according 
to need not means, along with equitable 
financial contributions and protection against 
catastrophic health expenditure. Guides to 
conducting diagnostic assessments of health 
financing and developing health financing 
strategies have been produced by WHO 
(Kutzin et al., 2017; McIntyre and Kutzin, 
2016), however, these were not tailored to 
specific contexts. In this section we consider 
specific challenges for health financing in 
FCAS settings, and discuss policy responses 
which have been made and what lessons can 
be drawn from them. 
FCAS settings are very heterogeneous, but 
some common challenges arise in them 
in relation to health financing, which are 
discussed below. These are not unique to 
FCAS settings – many are shared with other 
low-income countries, for example; however, 
they may be more common and more marked 
in FCAS.
Figure 1: UHC	goals	and	intermediate	objectives	influenced	by	health	financing	policy
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REVENUE RAISING AND 
POOLING
Indicators for health financing performance 
(Kutzin et al., 2017) emphasize the need to 
move towards a predominant reliance on 
public or compulsory funding sources, as well 
as increasing predictability in the level of 
public and external funding over a period of 
years, and improving stability in the flow of 
public and external funds.
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
Public funding is important for reaching UHC as 
it can provide the most stable, accountable and 
well-targeted resources. This is documented 
in wider studies (Kutzin, 2012; Kutzin et al., 
2017), though none have distinguished trends 
in FCAS versus non-FCAS countries. 
According to the IMF (2017), FCAS have the 
following characteristics:
  They have lower economic growth rates 
compared to non-FCAS, higher inflation, 
larger general government debt, and 
high dependence on official development 
assistance (ODA)
  Tax revenue to GDP in fragile situations 
tends to be lower than in non-fragile 
situations (the average tax revenue-to-
GDP ratio in FCAS was below 15 percent 
during 2005–2014, compared to 19 
percent in non-FCAS)
  Sources of tax revenue are less diversified 
than in non-FCAS
  Public expenditure levels are lower than in 
non-FCAS, especially for social spending
  Capital expenditure is higher than in non-
fragile low income countries, reflecting the 
need to rebuild damaged infrastructure 
and fill gaps in basic public services such 
as water, electricity, and transportation.
In addition, according to one study, conflicts 
reduce GDP growth by two percentage points 
per year, on average (World Bank, 2018a). 
There is some evidence of a positive ‘revenue 
peace dividend’ following conflict, but in some 
cases it’s only a modest recovery compared 
to pre-war levels (van den Boogaard et al., 
2018). All of these clearly create a constraint in 
relation to fiscal space for health care in FCAS. 
National health accounts (NHA) data for 
2012-2014 shows a wide spread in terms 
of proportion of general government 
expenditure which is devoted to health 
(Figure 2), ranging from 3-24%. Comparing 
FCAS and non-FCAS states, there is a small 
but significant difference in their government 
commitment to health, with FCAS countries 
as whole averaging 9.7% of government 
expenditure on health, compared to 12% for 
non-FCAS countries (Table 2), though this is 
largely driven by income, with more FCAS in 
the low income category. 
As a proportion of current health expenditure, 
government expenditure on health spans the 
whole spectrum in FCAS countries (2012-
2014 NHA data), from a low of around 5% in 
Afghanistan to more than 80% in some Pacific 
island states. FCAS have significantly lower 
average government expenditure on health 
as proportion of current health expenditures, 
compared to non-FCAS, which seems to be 
driven by low income FCAS countries (Table 
3). Government expenditure on health is also 
significantly lower for FCAS in the AFRO and 
EMRO regions. 
Increasing domestic tax revenues is integral 
to achieving universal health coverage, 
particularly in countries with low tax bases. 
However, the challenge is also to raise 
them in an equitable manner: globally, 
pro-poor taxes on profits and capital gains 
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Figure 2: Proportion	of	general	government	expenditure	devoted	to	health,	FCAS	countries,	
2012-2014
seem to support expanding health coverage 
without the adverse associations with health 
outcomes observed for higher consumption 
taxes (Reeves et al., 2015). 
More generally, taxation is seen by some 
authors as central to the task of state building 
in post-conflict states (though historically, 
in European states, it was also central to 
enabling ‘war and the means of war’) (van 
den Boogaard et al., 2018). This reflects the 
urgent need for revenue during the processes 
of post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the 
broader governance implications of taxation 
related to state capacity building and the 
expansion of governmental responsiveness and 
accountability. However, it is likely that conflict 
will, in fact, reduce revenue mobilization 
on account of conflict’s negative effects on 
economic activity, the tax base, tax collection 
efforts in conflict-affected regions and 
investment in effective public administration 
(van den Boogaard et al., 2018). 
EXTERNAL FINANCE
Overall, FCAS tend to get less aid for health 
than predicted based on GDP, although 
relative to domestic funding, this channel can 
still be significant. Graves et al. found that 
Data source: (WHO, 2018)
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FCAS received an average of $7.22 per capita, 
compared to $11.15 per capita for low-income 
but stable countries in 2005-2011 (Graves et 
al., 2015). Relative to stable countries, donors 
preferred to provide more funding to low-
income fragile countries that have refugees 
or on-going external intervention but tended 
to avoid providing funding to countries 
with political gridlock, flawed elections, 
or economic decline. Other studies linking 
conflict with aid funding also suggest wide 
variations in international support. In 2002 
and 2003, for example, Afghanistan received 
only $67 per person per year in foreign aid, an 
amount that is far lower than in other recent 
post-conflict countries such as Kosovo ($814), 
Bosnia ($249), and East Timor ($256) (Ahmad, 
2004).
Looking across the FCAS countries, the extent 
of external funding within current health 
expenditure is hugely varied, ranging from 
close to zero for Libya to more than 70% for the 
most aid dependent countries. In general, FCAS 
countries have a significantly higher average 
external funding as a proportion of health 
Table 3: Summary	of	results	of	quantitative	analysis:	Proportion	of	domestic	general	government	
health	expenditures	as	a	%	of	current	health	expenditures,	FCAS	vs.	non-FCAS	countries,	2012-
2014
N Mean SD T p
FCAS 35 31.691 22.414
Non-FCAS 156 56.314 19.573 6.545 <0.001***
Income
FCAS L 19 18.800 8.351
Non-FCAS 10 25.193 4.607 2.236 0.034**
FCAS LM 11 39.467 22.572
Non-FCAS 38 42.604 16.559 0.509 0.613
FCAS UM 5 63.573 21.370
Non-FCAS 46 56.822 13.574 -0.998 0.323
Region
FCAS AFR 19 23.791 13.034
Non-FCAS 28 39.493 19.476 3.073 0.004**
FCAS EMR 5 26.260 16.018
Non-FCAS 14 59.833 19.291 3.470 0.003**
FCAS EURO 2 46.150 32.692
Non-FCAS 50 66.062 16.684 1.610 0.114
FCAS SEAR 3 34.100 24.104
Non-FCAS 7 50.324 24.444 0.965 0.363
FCAS WPR 5 64.293 28.302
Non-FCAS 23 56.540 19.194 -0.753 0.458
Note: no High-income FCAS countries, only one FCAS in AM; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
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expenditures, and aid increases as a proportion 
of total health expenditure as national income 
falls. However, the relationship with FCAS 
status is more complex: we find no significant 
increase in aid dependence for low income 
countries (36% of current health expenditure 
for non-FCAS low income countries, compared 
to 32% for FCAS low income countries). By 
contrast, for upper middle-income countries, 
FCAS status is associated with higher external 
funding as a proportion of current health 
expenditure (Table 4).
There is a normative trajectory in which 
the shift from conflict to post-conflict is 
associated with a shift away from the 
international community as chief financing 
source to a wider base (Newbrander, 2006). 
However, data may not support this: the two 
main trends in health financing post-conflict 
are an increasing reliance on informal 
payments and on donor funding (De Vries 
and Klazinga, 2006). In fact, external support 
may need to increase over time in order to 
support the expansion of service provision 
(Witter, 2012). In any case, more important 
than volume is arguably how it is used. For 
example, Cambodia and Rwanda have made 
impressive progress in expanding coverage of 
healthcare in the aftermath of conflict, and 
Table 4: Summary	of	results	of	quantitative	analysis:	Proportion	of	external	funding	as	a	%	of	
current	health	expenditures,	FCAS	vs.	non-FCAS	countries,	2012-2014
N Mean SD T p
FCAS 35 23.913 19.784
Non-FCAS 120 9.079 14.053 -4.978 <0.001***
Income
FCAS L 18 31.741 15.825
Non-FCAS 10 35.863 14.437 0.681 0.502
FCAS LM 11 19.323 23.296
Non-FCAS 38 12.235 11.882 -1.375 0.176
FCAS UM 6 8.842 13.611
Non-FCAS 44 3.156 6.249 -1.773 0.083*
Region
FCAS AFR 18 28.595 18.053
Non-FCAS 28 22.080 17.242 -1.228 0.226
FCAS EMR 6 4.956 8.223
Non-FCAS 11 2.780 4.278 -0.727 0.478
FCAS EURO 2 2.062 0.780
Non-FCAS 23 1.959 3.099 -0.046 0.964
FCAS SEAR 3 21.557 15.969
Non-FCAS 7 3.247 3.966 -3.053 0.016**
FCAS WPR 5 36.555 24.019
Non-FCAS 19 15.988 17.828 -2.142 0.044**
Note: no High-income FCAS countries, only one FCAS in AM; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
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both have relied heavily on international 
funding (Witter and Bertone, 2018). 
Mobilising domestic resources in an equitable 
way is complex and it may therefore be more 
important in the post-conflict period to focus 
on maximising external aid in the short to 
medium term, especially for low income 
countries, but making it more predictable and 
stable and using it more effectively. 
Dependence on external financing is about 
more than resource flows: it brings with 
it external influences on plans, policies 
and implementation capacity, which can 
be supportive or undermining of local 
leadership and capacity, depending on the 
circumstances. Financing tends to be framed 
by donor agendas, particularly where the local 
state is weak, and local planning frameworks 
are either inadequate or developed with 
extensive technical assistance (Cometto et 
al., 2010; Pavignani et al., 2013). Transaction 
costs can also be very high, reducing the 
value of transfers to beneficiaries.
OUT OF POCKET PAYMENTS 
Looking at FCAS countries as a group, the 
level of out of pocket payments (Figure 3) 
as a proportion of total health expenditure is 
clearly very varied, ranging from under 10% 
to 74% (for Sudan). FCAS countries have a 
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Figure 3: Out	of	pocket	payments	(%	of	current	health	expenditure),	FCAS	countries,	2012-2014
Data source: (WHO, 2018)
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significantly higher average level of out of 
pocket payments, but there is no significant 
difference between FCAS and non-FCAS after 
controlling for income (Table 5). 
The gap left by a contracting or absent 
public purse is filled by households, often 
supported by family remittances from 
abroad, especially in countries with a large 
diaspora (Hill et al., 2014; Weiss Fagen and 
Bump, 2005). However, evidence on the 
amount of funding flows from remittances 
is limited to particular case studies. A study 
on expenditure at private health providers in 
three zones of Somalia, for example, found 
that salaries and remittances were the main 
reported sources for families to finance health 
care, with 23.5% of households relying on 
remittances (Lipcan et al., 2018).
Once all these financial contributions are 
added together, total health expenditure may 
attain considerable levels, with the highest 
proportion usually coming from out-of-pocket 
expenditure, especially for medicines, despite 
the level of poverty of the involved population 
(Pavignani et al., 2013). In Zimbabwe, for 
example, the dramatic decline in the health 
budget translated into an increased reliance 
on user fees, which has had a significant 
Table 5: Summary	of	results	of	quantitative	analysis:	Proportion	of	out	of	pocket	payments	as	%	of	
current	health	expenditure,	FCAS	vs.	non-FCAS	countries,	2012-2014
N Mean SD T p
FCAS 36 37.750 20.563
Non-FCAS 156 28.888 16.783 -2.732 0.007**
Income
FCAS L 19 42.983 13.633
Non-FCAS 10 34.606 17.549 -1.425 0.166
FCAS LM 11 37.453 29.149
Non-FCAS 38 39.191 17.597 0.246 0.807
FCAS UM 6 21.723 13.378
Non-FCAS 46 30.296 14.881 1.340 0.186
Region 
FCAS AFR 19 40.223 14.177
Non-FCAS 28 27.388 17.267 -2.682 0.010**
FCAS EMR 6 55.867 19.150
Non-FCAS 14 31.321 18.404 -2.703 0.015**
FCAS EURO 2 44.470 22.924
Non-FCAS 50 26.773 15.350 -1.580 0.121
FCAS SEAR 3 37.487 24.873
Non-FCAS 7 39.748 20.842 0.150 0.885
FCAS WPR 5 5.300 5.182
Non-FCAS 23 25.803 19.965 2.249 0.033**
Note: no High-income FCAS countries, only one FCAS in AM; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
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impact on service users, and the poorest in 
particular (Buzuzi et al., 2016).
OVERALL EXPENDITURE AND POOLING
Overall expenditure on health as a proportion 
of GDP ranged widely from less than 2% to 
17% in 2012-2014 for FCAS countries, with 
means of between 6-9%, depending on the 
income group. There was no significant 
difference between FCAS and non-FCAS 
countries (Table 6). 
In relation to volatility, total expenditure 
tends to be less changeable, but internally its 
composition can change – a crisis, for example, 
often reduces public expenditure, which is 
substituted by out of pocket expenditure. 
In Iraq, for example, the combination of the 
Isis insurgency in 2011-13, followed by the 
halving of oil prices in 2014 led to a drop in 
government expenditure as a proportion of 
total health expenditure from around 75% 
in 2011 to around 25% in 2015, which was 
exactly mirrored by a rise in out of pocket 
spending (Mòdol, 2018).
WHO emphasises the importance within 
pooling of enhancing redistribution of 
prepaid funds; ensuring that funding sources 
Table 6: Summary	of	results	of	quantitative	analysis:	total	health	expenditures	as	a	%	of	GDP,	
FCAS	vs.	non-FCAS	countries,	2012-2014
N Mean SD T p
FCAS 36 6.790 3.667
Non-FCAS 156 6.725 2.502 -0.126 0.900
Income
FCAS L 19 6.335 2.677
Non-FCAS 10 6.047 0.942 -0.328 0.746
FCAS LM 11 6.184 3.546
Non-FCAS 38 5.764 2.273 -0.472 0.639
FCAS UM 6 9.341 5.809
Non-FCAS 46 6.510 1.967 -2.491 0.016**
Region
FCAS AFR 19 5.896 2.652
Non-FCAS 28 5.884 1.990 -0.018 0.986
FCAS EMR 6 5.950 2.033
Non-FCAS 14 5.155 2.225 -0.750 0.463
FCAS EURO 2 8.702 1.351
Non-FCAS 50 7.937 2.253 -0.474 0.638
FCAS SEAR 3 3.091 2.389
Non-FCAS 7 4.710 2.987 0.823 0.434
FCAS WPR 5 12.301 4.675
Non-FCAS 23 5.845 2.404 -4.555 <0.001***
Note: no High-income FCAS countries, only one FCAS in AM; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
12 HEALTH FINANCING WORKING PAPER NO 13
are complementary; reducing fragmentation, 
duplication and overlaps; and simplifying 
financial flows (Kutzin et al., 2017). Historical 
performance in relation to UHC has been 
significantly associated with the level of 
pooled financial resources for health per 
capita (Global Burden of Disease Health 
Financing Collaborator Network, 2018). Low 
levels of prepayment and pooled funding in 
FCAS settings, as indicated by the high rates 
of out of pocket payments, is problematic in 
relation to all UHC dimensions. Contextual 
factors underlying this include low trust in 
public institutions, leading to fragmentation 
of risk pools, as well as disruption of pooling 
mechanisms which may occur during conflict 
(Ljubić et al., 1999). In humanitarian settings, 
an influx of refugees or internal displacement 
of populations add to the segmentation, with 
populations either unprotected or protected 
by different agencies with varying mandates, 
resources and coverage.
SUB-GROUP AND TREND ANALYSIS IN 
REVENUE COLLECTION AND POOLING
Analysis of chronic FCAS countries and 
conflict-affected FCAS show similar results 
to those described above, except that there 
was no difference in external expenditure 
as a proportion of total health expenditure 
for conflict-affected states, reflecting the 
literature on lesser donor engagement in 
these environments. Total health expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP is also lower compared 
to non-conflicted FCAS (p=0.051). The 
other significant differences also tend to be 
accentuated in conflict-affected FCAS.
Annex 4 contains more detailed analysis of 
selected health financing indicators by region. 
It highlights different patterns across WHO 
regions, with more significant challenge in 
the East Mediterranean Region (EMR) and 
African Region (AFR):
  Government expenditure on health as a 
proportion of total health expenditure is 
only significantly lower in FCAS in AFR 
and EMR
  Government expenditure on health as 
a proportion of general government 
expenditure is only significantly higher 
(p<0.1) for FCAS in Western Pacific 
Region (WPR)
  FCAS have significantly higher out of 
pocket expenditure as a proportion of 
total health expenditure in AFR and EMR; 
FCAS have significantly lower in WPR; 
and there is no difference in the European 
Region (EUR) or Southeast Asian Region 
(SEAR)
  External expenditure as a proportion 
of total health expenditure is only 
significantly higher for FCAS in SEAR and 
WPR
  Total health expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP is significantly higher for FCAS in 
the WPR alone
In relation to trend analysis:
  Government expenditure on health as 
a proportion of general government 
expenditure, external expenditure as a 
proportion of total health expenditure and 
government expenditure as a proportion 
of total health expenditure have increased 
slightly for both FCAS and non-FCAS over 
2007-14. 
  For out of pocket expenditure as a 
proportion of total health expenditure and 
total health expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP, however, there has been an 
improvement in FCAS performance over 
time, while non-FCAS have remained 
steady. 
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  However, the different starting position 
and wider range is clear from figures in 
Annex 4. Much of the gains in the latter 
two indicators appear to be driven by 
upper-middle income countries.
By WHO region, performance has also varied. 
In summary:
  Out of pocket payments have been steady 
for non-FCAS, but decreasing over time 
for FCAS in the EUR (which is now at non-
FCAS levels), SEAR and WPR (now below 
non-FCAS levels).
  External expenditure as a proportion of 
total health expenditure is steady for non-
FCAS, but decreasing for FCAS in EMR 
(which is now at non-FCAS levels) and 
increasing for FCAS in WPR (now above 
non-FCAS levels). 
  Government expenditure on health as 
a proportion of total health expenditure 
has been is increasing for FCAS in EURO, 
SEARO and WPRO, but decreasing for 
FCAS in EMRO
  Government expenditure on health as 
a proportion of general government 
expenditure has been decreasing for 
FCAS in the Americas (AM) and EMR, but 
increasing for FCAS in EURO (now at non-
FCAS levels), SEAR (now at non-FCAS 
levels) and WPR (now above non-FCAS 
levels)
  Total health expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP appears to have increased rapidly 
for FCAS in WPR (now well above non-
FCAS levels); the increase for FCAS is 
more gradual in AM, EURO and SEAR, 
and there has been a slight decrease for 
FCAS in EMR.
PURCHASING
Desirable attributes for purchasing systems 
(Kutzin et al., 2017) include that they:
  Increase the extent to which the allocation 
of resources to providers is linked to 
population health needs, information on 
provider performance, or a combination
  Move away from the extremes of either 
rigid, input-based line item budgets or 
completely unmanaged fee-for-service 
reimbursement
  Manage expenditure growth, for example 
by avoiding open-ended commitments in 
provider payment arrangements
  Move towards a unified data platform on 
patient activity, even if there are multiple 
health financing/health coverage schemes.
ASSESSING NEEDS AND 
PERFORMANCE
There is limited literature on health care 
purchasing in FCAS settings, but typically in 
these information on population needs and 
provider performance tends to be limited. 
Purchasing itself tends to be fragmented, 
including in some contexts by a plethora of 
external development and humanitarian 
actors – for example, in DRC, Provincial 
Health Authorities have up to 30 contracts 
with external partners (Witter and Bertone, 
2018).
PROVIDER PAYMENTS
In many FCAS, allocations of public funds are 
dominated by salaries and other inputs such 
as medicines and supplies, with higher level 
facilities such as hospitals capturing the bulk 
of funds. For example, in DRC the personnel 
expenditure doubled from 42% in 2007 to 
more than 80% of government expenditures 
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over 2009–2012, while the share of operating 
expenditure declined from around 26% in 
2007 to 8% in 2013. The share of capital 
expenditure also declined from 32% in 2007 
to 3% in 2012, but then jumped up again to 
27% in 2013 (Barroy et al., 2014).
As in many low income FCAS, there is no cash 
allocation to primary care facilities, leaving 
them dependent on fees. For example, a study 
in Papua New Guinea found that less than half 
of the health facilities that submitted budget 
requests received any funding as a result of 
doing so, and the average value of the funding 
received was much lower than budgeted for. 
As a consequence, user fees raised are greater 
than the subsidy allocations, and are the 
most widely collected and reliable source of 
revenue for health facilities (Wiltshire and 
Mako, 2014). Similarly, in the DRC most of the 
government budget is allocated to investment 
and a much smaller budget (only one-
quarter compared to the investments level) is 
allocated to ‘operations’, with no discernible 
geographical pattern and unpredictable 
execution (Barroy et al., 2014). Fee for service 
payments also dominate in the private (for-
profit and not-for-profit) and informal sectors. 
Insurance systems, which are more common 
in middle-income FCAS countries, generally 
pay user fee for services payments, with 
copayments, which do not control prices 
effectively. Meanwhile, contracted NGOs, in 
recovery situations, usually operate with line-
item budgets, negotiated during the bidding 
process for aid funding. Humanitarian 
funds are more typically awarded as block 
budgets, typically to NGOs (Mòdol, 2018). 
Humanitarian NGOs themselves tend to 
operate primary provision directly, while 
purchasing referral services by reimbursing 
public or private hospitals.
Providers in the public sector are often 
simultaneously restricted in their expenditure 
by limited and rigid funding rules but also 
ineffectually regulated: in an environment 
with complex remuneration and under-
funding, it is hard to ensure that health 
workers and providers follow public priorities 
(which themselves are often very contested or 
unclear) (Bertone and Witter, 2015a; Ensor 
and Witter, 2001).
MONITORING PAYMENT AND 
OUTCOMES
Health information systems tend to be partial 
in most FCAS and commonly operate in silos, 
making analysis linking funding with outputs 
(never mind outcomes) challenging. Budget 
and expenditure data are often disconnected 
and are typically managed by different teams 
to those working on other inputs (such as 
staffing, procurement, drugs) and on outputs. 
This makes performance management very 
challenging. Between international actors, 
including development and humanitarian 
sectors, sharing of data and coordination of 
monitoring is often poor. 
BENEFITS PACKAGES
Principles underlying benefits packages 
(Kutzin et al., 2017) include that there should 
be clarity on the population’s legal entitlements 
and obligations; the population should be 
aware of both their legal entitlements and 
their obligations as beneficiaries; and that 
promised benefits, or entitlements, should be 
aligned with provider payment mechanisms.
ENTITLEMENTS
The very notion of an entitlement is 
incongruous in many FCAS settings, where 
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capacity, legitimacy and security deficits 
result in lack of explicit or even implicit public 
entitlements to health care. Access to health 
care is more commonly perceived as resulting 
from personal and family resources, wider 
contacts and networks, requiring negotiation 
and transactions at different levels. 
While public policy may offer theoretical 
entitlements, their realisation is dependent 
on funding and strong implementation, which 
are often lacking, leading to low population 
awareness and limited real entitlement. 
Most FCAS countries lack clearly defined 
health care benefit packages at different 
levels of the health system, as well as data 
on their resourcing needs, although the 
definition of basic packages of health services 
(BPHS) is an area which has received support 
and investment in some FCAS countries, as 
highlighted below. For example, in the DRC a 
list of services to be provided at primary and 
secondary levels is defined nationally, but this 
does not correspond to specific entitlements 
for the population which vary based on donor 
funding and preferences and across areas of 
the country (Jacobs et al., n.d.; Mathew and 
Abiodun, 2017). The misalignment between 
BPHS and benefit packages presents a missed 
opportunity to reinforce good care seeking 
practices. Referral systems are often poor, 
leading to care seeking at referral, not primary 
level, and over-consumption of inappropriate 
services, such as unnecessary diagnostics and 
antibiotics.
PROVISION
Where there is lack of confidence in 
government by donors, or lack of capacity 
on the health system side, or simply strong 
external preference for non-state actors, 
funding is often channelled to (international) 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
which can increase effective coverage in the 
short term but also carries risks of patchy 
provision (NGOs often focus on specific 
areas) and higher costs. This pattern of 
contracting out is most common in post-
conflict or post-crisis settings, such as Haiti, 
Cambodia, Afghanistan, Liberia and South 
Sudan. Provision for refugees is also often 
provided through parallel services, which 
can cause tensions with host populations, as 
well as longer term challenges of transition 
(Blanchet et al., 2016). Another challenge, in 
particular for multilateral organisations, is to 
work in settings where the state and therefore 
the government is unrecognized (Garber et 
al., 2018). 
More generally, the capacity to regulate the 
pluralistic market of formal and informal, 
public and private (and hybrid) providers may 
be constrained by low capacity and funding 
for enforcement, leading to variations in 
quality and content of health care services. 
Private (for profit or not) providers of services, 
training and pharmaceuticals are often left 
to evolve and proliferate by the absent state, 
without regulation (Hill et al., 2014). Policies 
may be coordinated at central level, but 
external actors, such as NGOs, at local level 
(whose presence and distribution is often a 
legacy of the crisis period) may undermine 
these efforts: in Sierra Leone, NGOs at district 
level were shown to influence the HRH 
incentive package and redefine local health 
priorities (Bertone and Witter, 2015b).
UHC OBJECTIVES 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Literature on resource allocation in FCAS 
settings is limited (Witter, 2012). However, 
the wider political economy is such that 
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resources can be relatively easily captured by 
elite groups, and few FCAS countries operate 
formal resource allocation formulae based on 
need and other population-based indicators 
to ensure horizontal equity.
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
Again, the published evidence is limited but 
gaps in critical resources and rigidity about 
how they can be used can make even limited 
resource inefficient (for example, with public 
budgets often focussed on salaries, leaving 
a lack of funds for drugs, outreach, supplies 
and supervision, especially for frontline 
PHC services). In addition, countries with a 
shortage of trained staff face considerable 
pressure on wages for staff with transferable 
skills, such as doctors, nurses and midwives 
(McCoy et al., 2008; Witter et al., 2016b). 
Efficient pharmaceutical purchasing – 
typically the second most costly input into 
While	the	countries	that	are	in	emergency	suffer	disrupted	health	services	and	may	have	to	cope	
with	growing	numbers	of	IDPs,	their	neighbouring	countries	(even	if	previously	stable	and	not	
formally	recognised	as	FCAS)	often	have	to	host	large	numbers	of	refugees.	
The	very	nature	of	emergencies	means	 these	neighbouring	countries	are	usually	unprepared	
to	suddenly	 take	on	health	care	 responsibility	 for	 the	 influx	 (which	 is	often	made	up	of	 large	
numbers	 of	 people	 of	 all	 ages)	 and,	 again,	 there	 is	 added	pressure	 on	 already	 overstretched	
health	systems.	
The	situation	becomes	even	more	complex	when	refugees	from	one	country	(e.g.	from	Iraq	into	
the	Syrian	Arab	Republic)	have	to	face	another	crisis	in	their	host	country	as	a	result	of	a	new	
conflict,	or	when	natural	disasters	such	as	drought	hit	those	already	dealing	with	conflict.	In	such	
situations,	IDP	and	refugee	health	priorities	can	overlap.
The	main	service	provision	challenge	for	countries	that	neighbour	a	country	in	emergency	is	to	
deal	with	the	 large	numbers	of	refugees	and	migrants	and	ensure	their	access	to	health	care.	
These	groups	face:
	 	a	lack	of	availability	of	good	quality	services
	 	a	lack	of	access	to	the	service	providers
	 	inability	to	deal	with	local	systems	
	 	a	lack	of	awareness	and	information	about	health	entitlements
	 	language	and	cultural	differences
	 	administrative	hurdles	(such	as	a	need	for	paperwork).	This	is	especially	difficult	for	refugees	
coming	from	countries	in	acute	crisis	and	for	undocumented/irregular	migrants).
In	terms	of	financial	protection,	those	that	are	able	to	migrate	to	neighbouring	countries	following	
an	 emergency	 can	 face	 immense	 financial	 hardship	 when	 seeking	 health	 care.	 They	 are	 not	
usually	covered	by	the	local	financial	protection	schemes	available	to	nationals,	leading	to	high	
out-of-pocket	expenditure.	This	can	be	particularly	hard	as	they	may	have	no	employment	in	the	
host	country	and	have	complex	care	needs.	Delays	in	seeking	treatment	over	fears	about	costs	
affect	health-seeking	behaviours	and	contribute	to	avoidable	mortality	(WHO	EMRO,	2018).
Box 2: Challenges	for	countries	hosting	refugees
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health care services – also requires robust 
systems which are often lacking.
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
In a context where decision-making has 
often become ad hoc and data on population 
needs is lacking, the risks of poor allocation 
and capture of resources to serve the well-
connected minority is high, meaning that 
priority services are neglected. External 
funding also often leaves important gaps – for 
example, an analysis of humanitarian funding 
for reproductive health between 2002 and 
2013 found comparatively limited attention 
and programming for family planning and 
abortion care in particular (Tanabe et al., 
2015). Research suggest that global health 
initiatives (such as GAVI and the GFATM) 
are increasingly investing in conflict-affected 
countries, which has helped to rapidly 
scale up health services, strengthen human 
resources, improve procurement, and develop 
guidelines and protocols. Negative influences 
however can include distorting priorities 
within the health system, inequitable 
financing of disease-specific services over 
other health services, diverting staff away 
from more essential health care services, 
and limited flexibility and responsiveness to 
the contextual challenges of conflict-affected 
countries (Patel et al., 2015).
GOVERNANCE
In a context of weak, contested and 
sometimes oppressive governance, there is 
typically limited reporting, transparency and 
accountability for health financing decisions 
and resources. Where there is substantial 
external influence, these can become even 
more non-transparent (Bertone et al., 2018c) 
and institutionally fragmented (Beaston-
Blaakman et al., 2011). These challenges 
reflect low capacity, resources and, sometimes, 
legitimacy, and the challenges of managing 
complex systems.
The post-crisis moment offers risks and 
opportunities for the development of a national 
state: risks include capture of resources by 
privileged elites or increased opportunities 
for patronage and nepotism; opportunities 
include a new settlement in which governing 
actors revive the social contract through 
equitable financing, distribution of resources 
(such as infrastructure and staff) and services. 
Although it is under-studied, health financing 
has the potential to communicate political and 
social values, such as social solidarity (through 
cross-subsidies and pooling); inclusion 
(e.g. targeting poorer areas); equity (e.g. 
reducing financial barriers); reconciliation 
(e.g. resources allocated to opposition areas); 
human rights (e.g. establishing constitutional 
rights to health care); participation (e.g. 
civil society involvement); and confidence 
in public stewardship (e.g. donor resources 
channeled through public systems) (Witter, 
2018). There is emerging evidence that 
public health measures, including equitable 
access to basic health care, may contribute 
to peace-building- for example, reconciling 
warring sides – in the aftermath of conflict 
(Christensen and Edward, 2015; Sen and 
Faisal, 2015). However, the literature on 
health system linkages to state-building is 
contested and empirical evidence is hard to 
establish and hence limited (Eldon et al., 
2008; Percival, 2017; Witter et al., 2015). 
UHC GOALS
EQUITABLE ACCESS
Given disruption to services and financing, and 
underlying economic and social challenges, 
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achieving access to health care (including 
preventive, curative and palliative) according 
to need is likely to be more challenging in 
FCAS settings. Overall coverage for essential 
health care (UHC index for 2015) shows a 
wide range of performance, from around 
20% for Somalia up to more than 60% in Iraq 
(Figure 4). Differences between FCAS and 
non-FCAS settings are significant overall, and 
remain significant for all income levels and 
regions (Table 7). 
Patterns of equity across FCAS settings as a 
whole have not been systematically studied 
and there is a lack of recent benefits incidence 
analyses which allow for comparison, but 
individual case studies exist. For example, a 
historical analysis of Cote d’Ivoire from 1893 
to 2013 highlights how armed conflict has 
exacerbated historically inherited challenges 
to the health system including unequal 
distribution of health services (Gaber and 
Patel, 2013). An analysis in Palestine suggests 
that the worse-off have disproportionately 
greater needs for all levels of care. However, 
3	 	WHO	definition	for	this	index:	coverage	of	essential	
health	services	defined	as	the	average	coverage	of	
essential services based on tracer interventions that 
include reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health, 
infectious diseases, non-communicable diseases and 
service capacity and access, among the general and the 
most disadvantaged population.
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Figure 4: UHC	coverage3	index	(2015),	FCAS	countries,	2015
Data source: (WHO, 2018)
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with the exception of primary-level, 
utilisation of all levels of care appears to be 
significantly higher for the better-off (Abu-
Zaineh et al., 2011) – a finding which is 
common to other settings, but may be more 
pronounced in FCAS. While much of the 
inequality in utilisation appears to be caused 
by the prevailing socioeconomic inequalities, 
detailed analysis attributes about 30% of 
inequalities to heterogeneity in healthcare-
seeking behaviour across socioeconomic 
groups of the population. A study analysing 
the equity of the utilization of health services 
for 2010 in Afghanistan finds that utilization 
of inpatient and outpatient care and antenatal 
care was equally distributed among income 
groups. However, the poor used more public 
facilities while the wealthy used more private 
facilities. There was a substantial inequality 
in the use of institutional delivery services. 
Poorer women had a lower rate of institutional 
deliveries overall, in both public and private 
facilities, compared to the wealthy. Location 
was an important factor in explaining the 
inequality in the use of health services (Kim 
et al., 2016). 
Financial constraints are a major reason for 
Table 7: Summary	of	results	of	quantitative	analysis:	UHC	coverage	index	(%),	FCAS	vs.	non-FCAS	
countries,	2015
N Mean SD T p
FCAS 35 43.486 11.189
Non-FCAS 147 66.156 12.438 9.870 <0.001***
Income
FCAS L 20 37.800 7.838
Non-FCAS 10 43.100 6.724 1.825 0.079*
FCAS LM 11 49.727 10.071
Non-FCAS 38 56.632 10.839 1.888 0.065*
FCAS UM 4 54.750 12.816
Non-FCAS 44 68.068 6.708 3.511 0.001**
Region
FCAS AFR 20 37.350 7.393
Non-FCAS 28 50.036 11.286 4.392 <0.001***
FCAS EMR 6 50.333 13.140
Non-FCAS 14 65.500 10.331 2.780 0.012**
FCAS EURO 2 61.500 6.364
Non-FCAS 47 73.277 6.334 2.575 0.013**
FCAS SEAR 3 51.000 7.810
Non-FCAS 7 57.429 9.502 1.023 0.336
FCAS WPR 3 50.000 10.000
Non-FCAS 19 66.211 12.568 2.115 0.047**
Note: no High-income FCAS countries, only one FCAS in AM; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
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postponing or foregoing health care in many 
FCAS settings (Laokri et al., 2018). Meanwhile, 
FCAS settings are often characterized by high 
levels of spending on medical care abroad4, 
given health system challenges – spending 
which is generally highly inequitable.
Policy-makers need to respond to population 
movement during and after crises. Urban 
settings often attract displaced populations 
yet suffer from poor healthcare planning 
(Pavignani and Colombo, 2009). There needs 
to be investment to expand service coverage 
to slum areas and displacement camps 
4  Of total health expenditure in Afghanistan in 2011-12, 6% 
was managed by the Ministry of Public Health, and 10% by 
NGOs, however 17% was spent abroad (Mòdol, 2018).
on the assumption that populations will 
remain there for a significant period of time. 
Policy-makers need to react to changes once 
populations begin to return to their homes 
as people may then lose access to healthcare 
if similar services are not available in places 
of origin. For example, refugees returning 
home from displacement camps in Uganda 
reportedly shifted from formal to informal 
healthcare providers due to impoverishment 
and the costs of care (ReBUILD, 2016). 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION
Information on levels of catastrophic payments 
by households is not available for all FCAS 
countries, but for those available, the level 
ranged from around 1% in Madagascar to 
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Figure 5: Catastrophic	payments,	FCAS	countries	(most	recent	data	points;	dates	vary)
Data source: (WHO, 2018)
Note: calculations	are	based	on	last	year	for	which	data	are	available.	As	a	consequence	some	data	may	not	reflect	the	current	
situation or may not match the FCAS status (see Annex 1 for further information).
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more than 25% in Georgia and Nepal, using 
the 10% of household expenditure threshold 
(or close to zero up to almost 10%, if the 25% 
of household expenditure is used) (Figure 5). 
For all country income groups, FCAS have 
higher rates of catastrophic expenditure. 
Rates also rise for higher income countries, 
reflecting likely demand suppression at lower 
income levels (Tables 8-9).
Between 0 and 5% of the population are 
pushed below the poverty line in the FCAS 
countries for which we have data (Figure 
6). Overall, FCAS have significantly higher 
Table 8: Summary	of	results	on	catastrophic	expenditures	(population	with	household	
expenditures	on	health	greater	than	10%	of	total	household	expenditure	or	income),	FCAS	vs.	non-
FCAS	countries,	dates	vary
10% n Mean SD T P
FCAS 19 9.896 8.071
Non-FCAS 110 9.065 7.540 -0.439 0.661
Income
FCAS L 12 8.422 7.197
Non-FCAS 8 5.909 4.451 -0.878 0.392
FCAS LM 5 13.204 11.334
Non-FCAS 31 9.296 7.938 -0.964 0.342
FCAS UM 2 10.470 2.701
Non-FCAS 33 10.217 8.643 -0.041 0.968
Note: no High-income FCAS countries; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
Table 9: Summary	of	results	on	catastrophic	expenditures	(population	with	household	
expenditures	on	health	greater	than	25%	of	total	household	expenditure	or	income),	FCAS	vs.	non-
FCAS	countries,	dates	vary
25% n Mean SD T P
FCAS 19 1.765 2.317
Non-FCAS 110 1.776 2.124 0.019 0.985
Income
FCAS L 12 1.035 1.397
Non-FCAS 8 1.009 0.961 -0.046 0.964
FCAS LM 5 3.062 3.619
Non-FCAS 31 2.077 2.369 -0.802 0.428
FCAS UM 2 2.905 2.312
Non-FCAS 33 1.889 2.056 -0.676 0.504
Note: no High-income FCAS countries; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
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Figure 6: Population	impoverished	by	health	expenditure,	FCAS	countries	(most	recent	data	
points;	dates	vary)
Data source: (WHO, 2018)
Note: calculations	are	based	on	last	year	for	which	data	are	available.	As	a	consequence	some	data	may	not	reflect	the	current	
situation or may not match the FCAS status (see Annex 1 for further information).
Table 10: Summary	of	results	on	impoverishing	expenditures	(Population	pushed	below	the	$1.90	
a	day	poverty	line	by	household	health	expenditures),	FCAS	vs.	non-FCAS	countries,	dates	vary
$1.90 n Mean SD t p
FCAS 18 1.563 1.018
Non-FCAS 98 0.517 0.936 -4.296 <0.001***
Income
FCAS L 12 1.530 0.936
Non-FCAS 8 1.569 1.059 0.086 0.932
FCAS LM 4 1.940 1.259
Non-FCAS 26 1.099 1.322 -1.190 0.244
FCAS UM 2 1.005 1.421
Non-FCAS 29 0.296 0.449 -1.887 0.069*
Note: no High-income FCAS countries; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
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rates of impoverishment at both poverty 
line thresholds, and this is also significant 
for upper middle-income countries for the 
1.90USD thereshold (Tables 10-11).
Health financing policy and wider socio-
economic developments influence levels of 
catastrophic illness, alongside household 
determinants. In Sierra Leone, the incidence 
of catastrophic health expenditure decreased 
significantly from approximately 50% in 
2003 to 32% in 2011, as it moved away from 
the immediate post conflict period (Edoka et 
al., 2017) – a result of changing endowments 
and health system factors, including the Free 
Health Care Initiative of 2010.
Financing incidence in FCAS settings has 
received limited attention. However, where 
reliance on out of pocket payments is high, 
there is an increased likelihood of regressive 
financing of health care. A study of current 
health care financing schemes in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, for example, confirms 
the pro-rich character of out-of-pocket 
payments, compared to the progressivity of 
the government health insurance scheme 
(Abu-Zaineh et al., 2008).
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Weak public financial management systems 
contribute to many of the challenges above. 
An analysis of funding for immunization in 
DRC, for example, found that bottlenecks 
in the budget process and disbursement 
of funds were one of the causes of limited 
domestic resources for the programme. 
Critical bottlenecks included: excessive use 
of off-budget procedures; limited human 
resources and capacity; interference from 
ministries with the standard budget process; 
dependence on the development partner’s 
disbursements schedule; and lack of budget 
implementation tracking. Results show that 
the health sector’s mobilization rate (i.e., 
the ratio between allocated funds and those 
made effectively available) was 59% in 2011. 
Table 11: Summary	of	results	on	impoverishing	expenditures	(Population	pushed	below	the	$3.10	a	
day	poverty	line	by	household	health	expenditures),	FCAS	vs.	non-FCAS	countries,	dates	vary
$3.10 n Mean SD t p
FCAS 18 1.637 1.664
Non-FCAS 98 0.767 1.112 -2.804 0.006**
Income
FCAS L 12 1.376 1.507
Non-FCAS 8 1.020 0.719 -0.618 0.544
FCAS LM 4 2.592 2.176
Non-FCAS 26 1.721 1.486 -1.031 0.312
FCAS UM 2 1.290 1.782
Non-FCAS 29 0.632 0.720 -1.152 0.259
Note: no High-income FCAS countries; *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001
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For the credit line specific to immunization 
program activities, the mobilization rate 
for the national Expanded Program for 
Immunization (EPI) was 26% in 2011 and 
43% for vaccines in 2010 (Le Gargasson 
et al., 2014). A recent public expenditure 
review in DRC (Barroy et al., 2014) confirms 
that, despite the reform attempts, the 
fiscal management performance remains 
suboptimal at best, with key challenges 
especially in terms of budget preparation and 
execution. It is important to note that, as with 
many of the challenges identified, these are 
not unique to FCAS settings but may be more 
extreme there.
The relationship between corruption, 
health financing and FCAS countries is 
underexplored and is likely to be complex: 
weaker institutions and resource constraints 
may create more opportunities and pressures 
which increase corruption, though the volumes 
managed in better resourced systems will be 
higher. External finance with disbursement 
pressures and sometimes weak controls are 
another risk factor, and can develop into 
negative spirals with institutional capacity, 
as illustrated in Sierra Leone, where a GAVI 
accounting scandal was the result of but 
also had significant negative impact on the 
Ministry of Health and Sanitation’s capacity 
(Bertone et al., 2018c; Nossiter, 2013; Witter, 
2016). Either way, preventing and sanctioning 
corruption at all stages of the health financing 
pipeline is a constant challenge. 5 to 10% of the 
health budget in Cambodia was unaccounted 
for at the central level alone, according to one 
study (Hussman, 2011). However, most of 
the literature on health care and corruption 
focuses on more stable settings (Vian, 2008).
Similarly to taxation, some authors state that 
successful transition from conflict and fragility 
hinges on the quality and legitimacy of PFM 
systems (Porter et al., 2011). However, PFM 
is often fragmented and parallel cash flows 
and procurement systems are in place – for 
example, by donors, NGOs, global initiatives. 
This is a major source of inefficiency in fragile 
settings. Porter et al (2011) point to how PFM 
systems in FCAS often develop asymmetrically. 
Formal aspects of modern systems are layered 
with informal arrangements, and modern 
PFM mechanisms remain applied only to a 
small part of the main revenue sources. For 
example, a study on Burundi (CABRI, 2014) 
found that indicators relating to the use of 
country systems declined over 2006-2011 
period and that relatively little overall donor 
funding to Burundi passes through national 
public finance systems. Indeed, donors’ 
preference is for funding modalities which 
do not use country systems such as delivery 
of programmes through NGOs and projects, 
mostly due to the capacity weaknesses in 
systems and ministries as well as concerns 
about the governance environment, especially 
regarding the independence of the judiciary, 
media and the capability and bias of the 
police, in a post-conflict environment like 
Burundi. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
Conflict and institutional weakness can block 
systemic reforms (for example, in Ukraine, 
(Lekhan et al., 2015)). Loss of infrastructure 
and trained staff imposes constraints to 
planned reforms, such as the rebuilding of the 
Kosovo Health Insurance Fund post-conflict 
(Percival and Sondorp, 2010). However, the 
aftermath of crises can offer windows of 
opportunity to accelerate progress towards 
UHC, as well as for promoting health systems 
resilience (Witter and Hunter, 2017d). Those 
windows of opportunity may take some time 
to emerge while the state re-builds capacity 
and legitimacy for health system. This 
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was the case in Sierra Leone, where it took 
several years for the policy environment to be 
suitable for government- and donor-backed 
healthcare reforms that led to the Free Health 
Care Initiative (Bertone et al., 2014), however 
momentum for reform was soon lost (Witter 
et al., 2016a). Reforms, where undertaken, 
can leave a lasting legacy for the system – the 
decision to contract out services post-conflict, 
for example, can shape service delivery 
over subsequent decades, as happened in 
Cambodia (Vong et al., 2018).
RESILIENCE
Although not specific to health financing, 
the literature on resilience highlights general 
features which can support health systems in 
surviving and managing shocks of different 
types, duration and intensity. Capacities 
such as change management (Barasa et al., 
2017) ability to anticipate change, integrate 
knowledge, manage multiple players and 
create socially legitimate institutions 
(Blanchet et al., 2017) echo the literature on 
FCAS and highlight important qualities for 
health financing functions too. In one study, 
for example, the willingness to delegate 
responsibility and allow flexibility of resource 
use at local level was an important factor in 
resilience, allowing for absorptive, adaptive 
and transformative approaches in dynamic 
and challenging contexts of crisis and 
population movements (Alameddine et al., 
2018). 
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Policy responses to the challenges outlined 
above are focussed on certain areas, with gaps 
in relation to others, and also in relation to the 
literature which assesses their effectiveness 
and effects.
REVENUE RAISING AND 
POOLING
Much of the literature on revenue raising 
and pooling in FCAS has been focused 
on management of external funds and on 
addressing financial barriers in the form of 
user fees through various mechanisms. There 
has been limited attention paid to how far 
there is fiscal space for health in FCAS and 
how that can be expanded. Specific country 
analyses suggest that there may be space 
to expand domestic resource mobilization 
(for example, in Sierra Leone, (Witter et 
al., 2016b)). However, this area merits more 
attention across the group as a whole. 
IMPROVING FLOW AND USE OF 
EXTERNAL FINANCE
Different mechanisms for donor coordination 
exist, such as Health Pooled Funds, Multi-
Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), Sector-wide 
approaches (SWAps) and ‘state-building 
contracts’ (recently used by the EU – 
(Bernardi et al., 2015)). Some have been more 
commonly adopted to support health systems 
in FCAS states, such as MDTFs (World Bank, 
2011). In these settings, the emphasis has 
often been on coordinating with—rather than 
working through—governments (Hughes et 
al., 2012), particularly when trust or capacity 
is low, or international rules prohibit direct 
financing, such as in Zimbabwe (Salama et 
al., 2014). 
In relation to pooling funds, Commins et al. 
(2013) highlight potential advantages, such 
as donor coordination and harmonisation; 
operation on a larger scale; lower transaction 
costs; pooling risks in fragile contexts; 
supporting dialogue with the government, 
capacity development and service delivery. 
However, potential challenges include slow 
disbursement; dissatisfaction with results, 
leading donors to pursue parallel channels 
of funding. The study also raises important 
trade-offs which apply more broadly to 
support for health systems in FCAS, such as 
balancing speed of service delivery versus 
capacity building of government systems; 
low tolerance of fiduciary risk versus capacity 
development; donor attribution of results 
versus enhancing government ownership, 
alignment, and use of country systems; and 
achieving short term, visible impacts versus 
investment in slower, long-term (sustainable) 
change (Commins et al., 2013). 
Pooled funding mechanisms are often used to 
contract NGO delivery of services, particularly 
during the transition from humanitarian relief 
to the early-recovery phase. For example, in 
South Sudan, pooled donor funding supported 
primacy health care in ten states, where one 
NGO was designated as lead per county, with 
some success but also challenges of limited 
funding levels and absorptive capacity (Jones 
et al., 2015). In Liberia, the Health Sector 
Pool Fund supported an increase in health 
sector funding and the extension of the BPHS 
POLICY RESPONSES
27polIcy responses
to a majority of public health facilities by 
2010. This was supported by an accreditation 
process. The Pool Fund also strengthened 
country ownership and coordination between 
government, local NGOs, and international 
NGOs by enabling the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare to contract service provision 
(Lee et al., 2011). Access was extended, 
although it remained limited for rural 
Liberians (Kruk et al., 2010b).
Different aid instruments may allow for less 
fragmented and more aligned PFM systems. 
Aid through national systems may appear more 
risky than donors delivering projects directly 
or through non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) or humanitarian channels, but these 
risks can be managed. Strengthening national 
capacity for procurement, accounting 
and auditing, reporting and programme 
implementation is clearly part of the solution 
and may take time (Manuel et al., 2012). 
Pooled funds, including sector pooled funds 
as well as broader MDTFs, can provide 
closer alignment with national priorities, 
consolidate small projects into scalable 
national programmes, use national systems 
and harmonise and simplify the transaction 
costs of foreign assistance. While there are 
examples of pooled funds in FCAS settings, 
these include small and highly earmarked 
pooled arrangements, so their effectiveness is 
likely to be varied.
In humanitarian settings, there is a move 
to break down institutional silos across 
aid agencies by moving towards impartial 
and comprehensive needs assessments 
and country-based pooled funds (pooling 
funds across sectors). In this new model, a 
humanitarian coordinator and an advisory 
board that includes donor and agency 
representatives decide funding allocations 
independent of agency mandates, in order to 
respond in a more cohesive way to user needs 
(Konyndyk, 2018). 
Institutionally, it has been common in some 
FCAS settings for donors to support a semi-
independent programme management unit 
within Ministries of Health to take forward 
policy reforms and implement agreed policies. 
Within Afghanistan, for example, for years 
after the end of the conflict, service delivery 
was carried out largely by NGOs, funded 
by international donors, and managed by 
the Grant and Contracts Management Unit 
(GCMU) of the MoPH, which was considered 
by some a “Ministry within a Ministry”. The 
GCMU was heavily supported by donors. 
It is important that short term solutions do 
not become long-term problems, in terms of 
parallel systems. In 2009, the GCMU was 
restructured into the Health Economics and 
Financing Directorate (HEFD) with the aim 
of broadening the scope of the Unit (e.g., 
to conduct important economic analyses) 
and to strengthen the capacity of the MoPH 
(Beaston-Blaakman et al., 2011).
CONTRIBUTORY MECHANISMS 
There are some examples of insurance being 
extended to increase UHC in FCAS settings and 
in response to crises, although the evidence on 
effectiveness of this approach is limited and 
issues of lack of trust and lack of capacity affect 
ability to collect contributions. For example, 
in Palestine, Governmental Health Insurance 
(GHI) was initially compulsory for public 
sector employees. Later, GHI was expanded to 
the informal and private sectors on a voluntary 
basis, with reduced/waived premiums for some 
groups. However, premiums and exemptions 
were not in line with ability-to-pay and did 
not improve vertical equity (Abu-Zaineh et al., 
2008). Although GHI is only compulsory for 
public sector workers, special and vulnerable 
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groups are given free membership. For 
instance, about 60,000 families were granted 
free coverage during the 2001 Palestinian 
Intifada (Hamdan et al., 2003). 
In line with wider literature emphasizing 
risks of adverse selection and small risk-
pools, the experience of community-based 
health insurance (CBHI) has been mixed. In 
a CBHI pilot in five provinces of Afghanistan 
enrolment and cost-recovery were modest 
(enrolment rate was 6% of eligible 
households; cost recovery rates ranged up to 
16% of total operating costs) and no evidence 
of reduced out-of-pocket health expenditures 
was observed at the community level, 
though CBHI members had markedly higher 
utilization of health services (Rao et al., 2009). 
Insecurity, low quality of healthcare, poor 
awareness among the population and limited 
willingness to pay, as well as low technical 
capacity are all identified as barriers to 
expansion of health insurance in Afghanistan 
(Zeng et al., 2017). By contrast, in Rwanda, 
the scaling up of micro-insurance (mutuelles) 
– which do not share the same features as the 
typical CBHI, with high state subsidies and 
strong incentives to ensure high coverage 
– appears to have contributed to improved 
healthcare utilization and decreased out-of-
pocket spending, including among the poor, 
alongside other health financing reforms, 
namely performance-based financing (PBF) 
and fiscal decentralization (Sekabaraga et 
al., 2011). There is however evidence that 
members of female-headed households 
are less likely than those of male-headed 
households to be enrolled in the CBHI 
programme (Finnoff, 2016).
In Yemen, options for social health insurance 
are being considered for the post-conflict 
phase. Before the conflict, against a backdrop 
of lack of formal social health protection, 
a series of small-scale and often informal 
solidarity schemes developed, and a number 
of public and private companies set up health 
benefit schemes for their employees (Holst and 
Gericke, 2012). Given the existing lack of trust 
at the community level, any future scheme 
should build on preexisting programs already 
trusted in the community (Fuss, 2016). 
USER FEE EXEMPTIONS OR TARGETED 
EXEMPTIONS FOR VULNERABLE 
GROUPS
The general recommendation to reduce 
payments at the point of use for health care 
to shift toward greater risk pooling, equitable 
access and financial protection is even more 
pertinent in FCAS settings, where population 
vulnerability is higher and ability to pay 
is likely to be lower. In humanitarian and 
complex emergencies, there is an agreed 
interagency policy to suspend user fees for 
essential health care services (IASC, 2010). 
There has been less consensus in wider 
FCAS settings. However, a number of studies 
in FCAS settings highlight the potential of 
population-based exemptions. For example:
A quasi-experimental study in Afghanistan 
showed that abolishing user fees for the 
Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) did 
not affect quality of care but did improve 
utilisation. User fees raised only limited 
revenues and slowed the rate of increase of 
service utilization in Afghanistan. In 2008, 
the government abolished primary care fees, 
citing the results of this study (Steinhardt et 
al., 2013).
A study by Medicins sans Frontieres in 6 FCAS 
settings (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Chad, Haiti and Mali) 
found that user fees were found to result 
in low utilisation of public health facilities, 
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exclusion from health care and exacerbation 
of impoverishment, forcing many to seek 
alternative care. Financial barriers affected 
30–60% of people requiring health care. 
Exemption systems targeting vulnerable 
individuals proved ineffective, benefiting only 
1–3.5% of populations. Alternative payment 
systems, requiring ‘modest’ fees from users 
(e.g. low flat fees) did not adequately improve 
coverage of essential health needs, especially 
for the poorest and most vulnerable. Conversely, 
user fee abolition for large population groups 
led to rapid increases in utilisation of health 
services and coverage of essential healthcare 
needs (Ponsar et al., 2011).
Nepal introduced free delivery services for 
births in public facilities in 2005. A study 
reveals that free delivery care increased the 
likelihood of using public sector maternity 
services early in pregnancy, and lowered the 
likelihood of neonatal mortality. The results 
on neonatal mortality persisted with longer 
programme exposure, although the effects 
were smaller in magnitude (Lamichhane et 
al., 2017).
An evaluation of the Free Health Care 
Initiative, which provided free care for 
expectant and lactating mothers and 
children under five, in Sierra Leone 
concluded that it was one important factor 
contributing to improvements in coverage 
and equity of coverage, despite weaknesses 
in implementation in a number of core areas, 
such as drugs supply (Witter et al., 2016b). 
However, maintaining effectiveness of 
exemptions over time in weak health systems 
has been challenging, particularly where 
public financial support for health facilities 
is low (see, for example, in DRC (Maini et 
al., 2014)). In addition, many countries have 
multiple approaches to increasing financial 
access for vulnerable populations, which 
are not harmonized. Where this has been 
done, longer term sustainability is likely 
to be enhanced – for example, in Sudan, 
where a free-standing policy of free care for 
caesareans and under-five care was brought 
under the umbrella of the National Health 
Insurance Fund (Witter et al., 2013).
In addition, MSF has recently stressed a 
worrying trend of reintroduction of user fees 
despite the UHC commitment and the evidence 
on their inequitable effects, including in 
particular for populations affected by conflict, 
epidemics and crises (MSF, 2017).
HEALTH EQUITY FUNDS
One related approach to protecting low 
income households from health care costs 
has been Health Equity Funds (HEFs), which 
were piloted in post-conflict Cambodia since 
2000. These utilize third party organizations 
(non-governmental organization) to identify 
the poorest and refund specific health care 
costs. This avoids the conflict of interest for 
health care staff (who, in granting waivers, 
risk reducing their facility revenues, often 
without adequate reimbursement), and has 
been shown to improve access and reduce 
out of pocket spending on health care (Ir et 
al., 2010). The HEFs could be expanded to 
cover wider population groups and become 
semi-autonomous purchasing agencies 
(Axelson, 2018). HEFs are now being piloted 
in Laos, alongside other reforms (Thomé and 
Pholsena, 2009).
Outside South-East Asia, similar experiences 
of ‘equity funds’ to exempt the poorest in 
the communities from paying user fees 
for healthcare services have also been 
implemented including in fragile and conflict-
affected settings, although under slightly 
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different designs. For example, a number of 
PBF projects (see below, under ‘purchasing’) 
include arrangements to refund facilities for 
services provided for free to the very poor 
(Fritsche et al., 2014; Mayaka et al., 2011). 
However, the equity fund is often administered 
directly by the NGO/agency implementing 
PBF rather than by a third-party one. These 
experiences have been rarely assessed per se, 
i.e., not independently of the PBF programme 
of which they were a part. One exception 
is a pilot in northern Cameroon (Flink et 
al., 2016), which revealed challenges in the 
identification of the poorest, as well as other 
barriers to access for the very poor. 
A specific case also piloted by PBF projects 
is the reimbursement by the implementing 
NGOs of health services provided to internally 
displaced people (IDPs) at time of acute crisis. 
Such IDP-targeted equity funds have been 
introduced in the design of PBF projects in 
DRC, Central African Republic and Cameroon 
(Banga-Mingo et al., 2014; Bertone et al., 
2018b; Shu Atanga et al., 2015). 
Additionally, in some fragile settings such as 
the DRC, forms of equity funds have been 
introduced and managed by NGOs as one 
component of broader projects, with the aim 
of improving access to care for the very poor 
(Dijkzeul and Lynch, 2006; Gerstl et al., 2013). 
The NGO Handicap International has piloted 
equity funds covering rehabilitation services in 
Rwanda, Mali and Togo (Gerbier and Botokro, 
2009). In Syria, a WHO project contracted 
national NGOs to cover the user fees of 
vulnerable households obtaining services from 
private providers (WHO, 2017). However, 
few, mostly anecdotal descriptions of these 
arrangements exist and little or no assessment 
has been conducted on the projects.
DEMAND-SIDE FINANCING
Demand-side financing, such as vouchers and 
conditional cash transfers, have been used 
in FCAS settings, as in other low-income 
countries, to stimulate use of specific services 
and address access barriers, especially for 
reproductive health care. In countries such as 
Yemen and Pakistan, vouchers have been used 
with some success to increase access to family 
planning by poor households from public and 
private facilities (Boddam-Whetham et al., 
2016). However, there are preconditions for 
effectiveness, which include that adequate 
services must be in place, with some 
population access and capacity to manage the 
voucher scheme. In Yemen, despite worsening 
conditions in 2014, a voucher programme 
was able to channel funds to facilities at a 
time when funds flowing were highly erratic, 
enabling them to address stock-outs of drugs 
and supplies at the local level and protect the 
supply of critical maternal newborn health 
services for poor women and their families 
(Grainger et al., 2017).
In Syria, 18,000 women received maternal and 
reproductive services through vouchers. The 
programme resulted in an increase in the use of 
antenatal and post-natal care, and institutional 
delivery, allowed women to choose providers, 
improved equitable access to RH services, 
improved staff and women’s satisfaction 
and led to a reduction in turn-over of health 
professionals. However, some challenges 
remained in terms of targeting of population 
most in need, controlling the overbilling and 
unnecessary procedures, persistent security 
barriers and difficulties in accessing health 
facilities, difficulty in monitoring private 
sector hospitals, and finding adequate financial 
resources (Balan, 2015).
In Afghanistan, a conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) programme in 2009-2011 was 
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For	the	health	sector,	the	transition	from	a	humanitarian,	emergency	phase	to	early	recovery	
and	post-conflict	is	often	seen	as	focusing	on	three	types	of	interventions,	which	are	normally	
considered	sequential:	(i)	meeting	the	immediate	health	needs	of	conflict-affected	populations,	(ii)	
restoring	essential	health	services,	and	(iii)	rehabilitating	the	health	system.	In	terms	of	funding,	
there	is	often	a	contraction	due	to	the	reduction	of	humanitarian	funding	and	the	shift	towards	
development	aid,	which	may	be	slow	to	take	up	(so-called	‘transitional	funding	gap’)	(Canavan	et	
al.,	2008),	or	government	funding	which	(as	described	above)	may	take	longer	to	materialise.	While	
service	delivery	during	crisis	and	the	immediate	aftermath	are	usually	provided	by	humanitarian	
NGOs,	the	role	that	NGOs	may	play	during	the	following	phase	depends	on	decision	made	(for	
example,	whether	to	contract	them	or	not)	and	the	type	of	NGOs	involved	may	change.	Finally,	
as	the	transition	progresses,	the	focus	also	shifts	from	providing	or	restoring	essential	services	
to	an	increased	attention	to	institution	building	for	the	health	systems,	including	strengthening	
the	capacity	of	the	government	to	define	priorities,	ensure	governance	and	stewardship	of	the	
health	system	(Brinkerhoff,	2008).
THE CASE OF LIBERIA
Early transition period (2003-2006)
In	 this	period,	healthcare	delivery	 in	Liberia	maintained	a	humanitarian	approach.	77%	of	 the	
functioning	 facilities	were	supported	by	 international	NGOs	meeting	 the	 immediate	needs	of	
the	populations	 (Canavan	et	al.,	2008).	However,	 these	efforts	were	uncoordinated	and	there	
was	no	medium	or	long-term	vision	for	the	rehabilitation	of	the	health	system.	By	the	end	of	the	
period,	three	years	after	the	end	of	the	war	and	with	the	establishment	of	a	new	government,	
humanitarian	donors	 felt	 that	 their	mandate	and	 their	 role	 in	Liberia	were	coming	 to	a	close.	
As	development	funding	was	slow	in	coming,	there	were	concerns	about	a	funding	gap	for	the	
sector	(Sondorp	and	Coolen,	2012).	
Early policy development and Liberia Partners Conference (2006-2007)
With	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 due	 to	 the	 potential	 funding	 gap	 and	 the	 limited	 capacity	 of	 the	
government	to	ensure	service	provision,	in	August	2006,	a	workshop	was	held	to	bring	the	main	
stakeholders	together	to	 identify	the	major	challenges	and	the	key	future	policy	orientations	
to	ensure	donor	coordination	as	well	as	alignment	and	support	to	the	Ministry	of	Health	vision.	
A	 number	 of	 recommendations	 emerged	 from	 the	workshop,	 including	 the	need	 to	 define	 a	
Basic	Package	of	Health	Services	(BPHS)	and	the	option	of	contracting	NGOs	to	provide	health	
services	(Sondorp	and	Coolen,	2012).	In	February	2007,	the	government	and	the	main	donors	met	
in	Washington,	DC	for	the	“Liberia	Partners	Conference”,	where	pledges	of	support	from	donors	
were	obtained	(Canavan	et	al.,	2008).	In	this	way,	the	transitional	funding	gap	was	averted	both	
by	increasing	new	funding	and	extending	humanitarian	(ECHO)	funding	(Hughes	et	al.,	2012).
After	2007	a	change	in	funding	sources	took	place	with	the	shift	from	humanitarian	to	development	
funding.	This	led	to	the	withdrawal	of	a	number	of	humanitarian	NGOs,	which	handed	over	some	
of	the	facilities	that	they	were	supporting	to	other	NGOs,	while	others,	especially	at	secondary	
level,	faced	funding	and	capacity	constraints	and	were	unable	to	provide	services	(Canavan	et	al.,	
2008).
Box 3: Transition	from	conflict	to	early	recovery	and	post-conflict	–	the	case	of	Liberia
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Implementation of the National Health Policy and Plan (2007-2011)
By	2007,	the	new	National	Health	Policy	and	Plan	(2007-2011)	was	launched	which	defined	the	
priorities	of	the	health	sector	and	focused	in	particular	on	decentralization	and	the	definition	of	
a	BPHS,	while	acknowledging	the	need	for	continued	support	from	donors	(Sondorp	and	Coolen,	
2012).	
Donors	 opted	 for	 different	 approaches	 to	 support	BPHS	 service	delivery.	 Some	donors	 (e.g.,	
USAID,	EU)	continued	to	fund	their	programme	or	NGOs	directly,	while	other	chose	to	set	up	a	Pool 
Fund which	allowed	the	MoH	to	have	a	more	direct	influence	over	fund	allocations	(Sondorp	and	
Coolen,	2012).	The	Health	Sector	Pool	Fund	was	established	in	March	2008	under	the	oversight	
of	a	 representative	 steering	committee	 chaired	by	 the	Minister	and	managed	by	an	external	
firm.	Importantly,	Pool	Fund	expenditures	relied	on	national	systems,	including	procedures	for	
procurement,	financial	management,	audit,	monitoring	and	evaluation	(Hughes	et	al.,	2012).	In	
2012,	the	Pool	Fund	had	attracted	over	US$	40	million	in	total	contributions	from	four	donors	
(DFID,	Irish	Aid,	UNICEF	and	UNHCR),	which	represented	on	average	10%	of	total	donor	support	
for	health.	Although	a	relatively	small	proportion,	some	saw	it	as	critical	to	improve	the	capacity	
of	the	MOH,	especially	in	the	area	of	financial	management,	donor	coordination	and	stewardship.	
Additionally,	funding	from	the	Pool	Fund	supported	over	one-third	of	public	health	facilities,	via	
contracts	with	NGOs	or	contracting-in	arrangements	(Hughes	et	al.,	2012;	Lee	et	al.,	2011).	
With	 the	 establishment	 of	 these	 policies,	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 move	 from	 humanitarian	 to	
development	 approaches.	 However,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 government	 and	 MoH	 lacked	 the	
systems	and	capacity	to	ensure	provision	of	health	services.	As	of	2009,	a	number	of	different	
contracting	arrangements	came	into	place	with	international	NGOs	and	faith-based	organisations,	
in	the	form	of	performance-based	management	contracts,	or	management	contracts	through	
grant	arrangements	(without	performance-based	elements),	as	well	as	one	pilot	‘contracting	in’	
arrangement	in	one	county	(Sondorp	and	Coolen,	2012).	A	process	of	accreditation	of	facilities	
also	started	(Cleveland	et	al.,	2011).
In	summary,	over	the	transition	period	Liberia	was	able	to	implement	a	series	of	complementary	
health	and	health	financing	reforms.	It	appears	that	these	have	contributed	to	guarantee	sufficient	
and	predictable	funding	during	the	transition	and	to	ensure	continued	service	delivery.	However,	
one	key	area	where	improvement	has	been	slow	is	the	strengthening	of	institutional	capacity	
and	human	capital	(Sondorp	and	Coolen	(2012).	Additionally,	vulnerabilities	remained,	especially	
at	community	level	(for	example,	in	surveillance,	coordination,	testing,	and	social	mobilization),	
which	set	the	stage	for	the	2014	Ebola	epidemic	(Abramowitz,	2016).	A	2010	assessment	found	
that,	although	there	had	been	progress	in	the	provision	of	basic	services,	some	communities	and	
in	particular	the	rural	ones	still	had	limited	access	to	health	care,	and	that	health	provision	was	
skewed	to	services	favoured	by	donors	(such	as	HIV	testing	and	malaria	treatment)	(Kruk	et	al.,	
2010b).	Petit	et	al.	(2013)	pointed	to	a	number	of	implementation	challenges,	including	for	health	
workers,	who	appeared	to	have	limited	understanding	of	the	BPHS	and	associated	it	with	low	
salaries,	difficult	working	conditions,	and	limited	support.
Box 3: Contd.
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evaluated as successful in stimulating demand 
for MCH services and increasing utilization 
of targeted services, in particular when both 
families and community health workers were 
targeted (Lin and Salehi, 2013). However, 
there was also evidence of non-economic 
barriers to care which impeded women’s 
access (Witvorapong and Foshanji, 2016).
HEALTH FINANCING IN EMERGENCY 
SETTINGS
Humanitarian funding (13% of overall ODA 
– (Spiegel, 2018)) is focused on preparedness, 
acute and protracted crises. In these settings, 
there are heightening risks of outbreaks and 
epidemics, which requires rapid responses 
from local, national and international levels. 
Challenges include persistent under-funding 
of the humanitarian response plan, including 
most recently in Yemen, where WHO’s 
response plan for 2016 received 24% of total 
requested funding (Qirbi and Ismail, 2017). 
Funding per capita tends to be very variable 
and not necessarily related to needs. 
New options for raising external funding for 
refugee health care are proposed, including 
combined indexed insurance and catastrophe 
bonds, the establishment of a Refugee Health 
Financing Emergency Facility’ in the pre-
emergency phase, and use of the World 
Bank’s IDA concessional loan program to 
support refugee hosting countries (Spiegel et 
al., 2018), although these are yet to be fully 
elaborated and tested.
There is also recognized need for better 
interface between humanitarian and 
development actors on analysis, planning, 
coordination and pooling in the health sector, 
internationally and at national level (UN, 
2016). At the beginning of a crisis, funding 
can decrease as the usual donors leave and 
emergency funds take longer to be triggered. 
This was the case in Mali, for example, 
following the invasion of the Northern regions 
of the country by terrorist groups and a coup in 
March 2012, when donors suspended official 
development assistance, except for support 
to NGOs and humanitarian assistance and 
took months before organizing alternative 
and only partial solutions to resume aid to 
the health sector (Paul et al., 2014). Equally, 
the transition from humanitarian stages to 
development can leave financing gaps, and 
in protracted crises none of these phases are 
clear and distinct in any case.
There has been a long-standing debate 
about user fees for health care during crisis 
situations (Derderian, 2014). Humanitarian 
NGOs have always strongly advocated in 
favour of raising funds internationally and 
providing free care to communities during 
crises, and in particular to refugees, IDPs and 
vulnerable groups. However, in many weak 
and underfunded health systems patient fees 
are still considered as an acceptable ‘survival 
strategy’ of the system. MSF experience in 
DRC has shown reluctance by health facilities 
to declare outbreaks, because this would 
imply suspension of patient fees (Derderian 
and Schockaert, 2010). Meanwhile, until 
around 2008-2010, some donors, like ECHO, 
supported cost-recovery (i.e. fees covering 
partial costs of services) as a developmental 
strategy: they believed that the introduction 
of fees is inevitable, conformed with local 
policy and practice, and that bringing them in 
at an early stage would contribute to building 
a sustainable, locally financed health system 
in the longer term (Hands, 2004). However, 
the contrary view strongly argued that cost-
sharing is likely to raise little money, have a 
significant negative impact on equity, which 
cannot be effectively mitigated via exemption 
mechanisms, have a negative impact on 
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efficiency, result in unequal access to care, 
potentially tip individuals and families 
into destitution via catastrophic health 
expenditure, potentially hamper efforts to 
control epidemic infectious disease, needlessly 
increase the complexity of programming 
in already challenging environments, 
potentially damaging the motivation of local 
staff and the relationship between local and 
expatriate staff (Poletti and Sondrop, 2004). 
Arising from this debate, a shift in approach 
ensued and consensus has been reached that 
user fees for primary health care services 
should not be applied during humanitarian 
situations, given the humanitarian principles 
of impartiality and human rights (DG ECHO, 
2009; IASC, 2010).
UNHCR advocates that essential primary 
health care and emergency services be 
provided free of charge to refugees during 
an emergency (UNHCR, 2012). Furthermore, 
certain essential services such as childhood 
vaccinations, antenatal and delivery care, 
and communicable disease control (e.g. 
tuberculosis) should be provided free to 
all refugees during the post-emergency 
phase. Fees for all others services depend 
upon the context, but UNHCR advocates 
that they should not be higher than those 
prices charged to nationals. Furthermore, 
vulnerable refugees should be identified and 
a suitable safety net provided for them to 
ensure access to preventative and curative 
health services. The agency advocates that 
government services are accessible to and 
used by refugees whenever possible. However, 
in neighbouring countries like Jordan, this 
has put a tremendous pressure on national 
health financing: from 2012 to 2014 Syrian 
refugees living outside refugee camps were 
entitled to use free services at Ministry of 
Health facilities, however the cost of this led to 
restrictions being introduced (Axelson, 2018).
Moreover, issues emerge during protracted 
emergencies or in fragile countries that 
keep moving between emergency and post/
pre-emergency phase and where both 
humanitarian and development NGOs 
are present and where services are not 
provided for free to the entire population. 
In a paper on MSF’s experience along the 
Liberia-Cote d’Ivoire border, although the 
difficulties posed by protracted crises are 
recognised, the authors still argue for the 
suspension of user fees. “Protracted crises 
and fragile post-conflict settings have 
challenged the co-existence, and even the 
linear continuum, of relief and development 
aid. This ‘backsliding’ from development to 
emergency remains a substantial challenge to 
aid; yet, in exactly such cases, it also presents 
the opportunity to ensure access to medical 
care that is much more urgently needed in 
times of crisis, including the suspension of 
user fees for medical care” (Derderian, 2014). 
Similar situations have emerged in the case 
of Eastern DRC and CAR, where ideological 
and operational clashes have occurred 
between humanitarian and development 
NGOs (Bertone et al., 2018b; Derderian and 
Schockaert, 2010).
NGOs have dealt in a variety of ways to address 
the issue of fee charging in protracted crises. 
In DRC, Malteser International suggested 
introducing flat-rates for health care services. 
For the poorest 10% of the population, free 
access is assured through so-called equity 
funds to be administered according to health 
committee recommendations. However, 
they note that “once the project ends, the 
population will have to pay again for their 
health service” (Gerstl et al., 2013). This 
raises the problem of sustainability of free or 
subsidized care after the acute phase of the 
crisis ends. 
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Where insurance systems are already 
established, purchasing insurance coverage 
on behalf of vulnerable, displaced and refugee 
populations is a strategy used by a number of 
aid agencies, both in FCAS countries and also 
countries which host refugee communities 
(UNHCR, 2012). Clearly, this has the 
potential advantage of utilizing and investing 
in existing health financing infrastructure. 
In Iran, the government and the UNHCR 
launched the health insurance scheme 
(HISE) for Afghan refugees in 2011 through 
a semi-private insurance company, as the 
government did not allow refugees access to 
the national system at that time. HISE was 
made available to registered refugees on an 
individual and voluntary basis, with a system 
of premiums and co-payments (refugees in 
Iran are allowed to work). For those who 
could not pay and met the vulnerability 
criteria, the UNHCR covered their costs. In 
2015, negotiations were concluded with the 
government to allow refugees access to the 
national HISE (Spiegel et al., 2018). In Sudan, 
a pilot using the National Health Insurance 
scheme to cover IDPs in Darfur had some 
success, based on the existing institutional 
strength of the NHI in that state (Witter, 
2015).
Cash transfers have been growing in use in 
humanitarian contexts. They are used in most 
sectors, including food security, livelihoods, 
shelter, water and sanitation, protection, 
health, nutrition and education, but account 
for no more than 6% of humanitarian 
assistance (World Bank, 2016). Cash 
transfers are most effective and efficient 
when provided as ‘multipurpose cash’ – one 
grant to address multiple needs across sectors 
(Fabre and Aggiss, 2017). Proponents of 
cash- and voucher-based approaches argue 
that they can be more cost-effective and 
timely, allow recipients greater choice and 
dignity, and have beneficial knock-on effects 
on local economic activity. Sceptics fear that 
they are often impractical because they incur 
additional risks of insecurity and corruption, 
and argue that cash may be more difficult to 
target than commodities. Even where these 
approaches are feasible, there are concerns 
that women may be excluded, that cash may 
be misused by recipients and that it may have 
negative effects on local economies and could 
fuel conflicts. Vouchers are often used when 
cash is not seen as possible or appropriate. 
This may be due to donor constraints, to a 
desire to ensure that a particular type of good 
or commodity is purchased by the recipients, 
because of security fears about the use of cash 
or because of market weaknesses (Harvey, 
2005). 
Most studies of cash-based approaches focus 
on non-health benefits, such as food security. A 
recent review concludes that in terms of costs, 
cash transfers can be an efficient strategy 
for providing humanitarian assistance. 
Unconditional cash transfer programmes 
have a lower cost per beneficiary than 
vouchers which, in turn, have a lower cost 
per beneficiary than in-kind food distribution 
(Doocy and Tappis, 2017). A variety of card-
based systems and mobile transfers can also 
reduce costs and increase speed. However, 
with relation to health care, unconditional 
cash transfers may not work as well as they do 
for food, as health needs are not distributed 
equally across populations and out-of-pocket 
payments for health costs are not predictable 
(WHO & Global Health Cluster, 2018).
PURCHASING
There has been limited attention to purchasing 
in FCAS beyond the topic of contracting and, 
more recently, some attention to performance-
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based financing (PBF) as a potential approach 
to strengthening health care purchasing.
CONTRACTING OF SERVICES 
Contracting out services to NGOs is an 
approach which has been adopted for health 
care purchasing in many FCAS settings, 
often when public service delivery capacity is 
limited or donors are unable or unwilling to 
fund public services directly. These contracts 
are sometimes funded out of pooled funds, 
and linked to the development of basic 
packages of services. 
Haiti is one of the earliest examples of 
performance-based contracting: NGOs 
have been contracted since 1999 to provide 
primary health care services, in a context 
of violence, poverty, limited government 
leadership and the inability of the Haitian 
government to ensure access to basic health 
services. Some success in increasing coverage 
and capacity is reported (Eichler et al., 
2009). Incentives and technical support both 
contributed to increased primary health care 
service delivery (Zeng et al., 2013). However, 
in another challenging environment, South 
Sudan, logistical and security constraints have 
created severe implementation challenges 
for two performance-based contracting 
programmes (Morgan, 2005).
Contracting can also occur with public 
facilities – internal contracting – and indeed 
some countries have moved over time from 
contracting out to a hybrid model, followed 
by internal contracting. In Cambodia, 
since the late 1990s, contracting has been 
used to accelerate the recovery of the rural 
health system after the devastation of the 
Khmer Rouge period. Contracting out was 
piloted between 1999 and 2002/3. This was 
followed by “hybrid contracting” and, from 
2009, Special Operating Agencies, which 
test a form of internal contracting (Vong et 
al., 2018). Jacobs et al describe the transition 
over a 3-year period in a health district to 
hybrid contracting in Cambodia (Jacobs et 
al., 2010). The transition from NGO-managed 
to government-managed contracting was 
achieved by focusing on all the building 
blocks of the health care system and ensuring 
an acceptable financial remuneration for the 
staff members of contracted health facilities. 
The latter was attained through performance 
subsidies derived from financial commitments 
by the central government and revenue 
from user fees. Performance management 
had a crucial role in the gradual handover 
of responsibilities. Not all responsibilities 
were handed back to government over the 
case study period—notably the development 
of performance indicators and targets and 
the performance monitoring (Jacobs et al., 
2010). In the SOA model, hospitals and health 
centers were contracted by the provincial 
health department as Special Operating 
Agencies (SOAs) and provided with greater 
management autonomy (Khim and Annear, 
2013).
There are reported increases in utilization 
of services by the general population and 
the poor under the SOAs (Vong et al., 2018), 
although robust evaluation is challenging 
given the selection approach to SOAs and the 
additional resources provided to them. More 
interesting from the evolution of models in 
Cambodian is the iterative learning, and 
gradual resumption of national leadership 
despite continued financial and technical 
reliance on the plethora of international 
agencies which have contributed to the health 
sector over the past two decades.
In Afghanistan, a few inter-linked policies 
were introduced, the most important of 
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which were defining a package of priority 
health services, known as the basic package 
of health services (BPHS), contracting with 
NGOs to deliver the basic package of health 
services, and prioritizing monitoring and 
evaluation of health sector performance 
(Loevinsohn and Sayed, 2008). Afghanistan 
has used two models – contracting out and in. 
In the former, NGOs operate under delivery 
contracts. In the latter, the MOPH contracts 
in managers to help strengthen services 
delivered using MOPH staff. The comparison 
models shows that contracting in provinces 
achieve greater improvements in maternal and 
child health coverage relative to contracting 
out provinces, but the absolute difference in 
improvements is small (World Bank, 2018b). 
The two contracting approaches also deliver 
similar results in terms of improvements in 
health systems performance. According to 
the World Bank report, the contracting out 
approach has performed well in insecure 
settings, due to NGO flexibility. However, 
Blaakman et al. (2013) found that the 
cost per BPHS outpatient visit was 58.5% 
higher in contracted-out provinces than in 
contracted-in provinces.
Alonge et al. (2015) compare different design 
of contracting out and in in Afghanistan, 
involving variations in budget flexibility, fixed 
or negotiable outputs, input or output-based 
payments and performance bonuses. They 
conclude that the contracting out arrangement 
which allows contractors to decide on how 
funds are allocated within a fixed lump sum 
budget with non-negotiable deliverables, and 
is actively managed through an independent 
government agency, is effective in improving 
equity of health services provision.
The widely portrayed success of the 
contracting model in Afghanistan is backed 
up by high official figures for health service 
coverage but contrasts with evidence at 
household level, which suggests limited 
utilization of public health services, 
perceptions that these offer inferior quality, 
and a preference for private providers. The 
disconnection may be partly explained by 
under-estimated delivery costs: under-funded 
NGOs expected to provide health care to a 
whole contracted-out area managed to serve 
only a modest portion of its population. 
Despite ‘free care’, household out-of-pocket 
expenditure remains by far the largest source 
of health financing in Afghanistan, dwarfing 
all other funding sources, and capable of 
forcing poor households into catastrophic 
expenditure (Michael et al., 2013), although 
it has since been reducing.
Overall, experiences with contracting-out 
indicate that health service delivery can 
be considerably improved in a short time 
(Loevinsohn and Sayed, 2008; Soeters 
R and Griffiths F, 2003), and this model 
seems to have had particular resonance 
in in post-conflict situations (Blaakman et 
al., 2013; Palmer et al., 2006). Outstanding 
questions relate to the longer term impact 
of this approach and its cost-effectiveness 
– is contracting out by-passing weak public 
institutions or building capacity? How can it 
phase into longer term system strengthening? 
How cost effective is it in relation to alternative 
approaches? Jayasinghe (2009) also identifies 
some ethical issues related to contracting, 
including in FCAS settings, such as the need 
for accountability to the population, equity 
of access, sustainability and regulation of 
conflicts of interests. 
Reflecting on the Cambodian experience, 
which now focused on contracting-in, 
Vong et al. (2018) also make some critical 
reflections, highlighting profound cultural 
and institutional constraints such as social 
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resistance to the involvement of non-state 
actors; limited willingness and/or capacity 
within the non-state sector to enter into 
contractual arrangements; bidding processes 
that may erode quality and favour local 
cronyism; and that performance based 
contracts may rule out informal providers 
who are often the most important source of 
health care for poor people.
PERFORMANCE-BASED FINANCING 
(PBF)
PBF – in which health facilities (largely) are 
paid according to the volume of verified and 
specific services that they produce, modified 
by quality scores – has been increasingly 
implemented in low and middle income 
countries over the last decade. A recent 
literature review of PBF in FCAS settings 
(Bertone et al., 2018a) found that PBF is 
currently implemented in 23 FCAS, which 
are often the early implementers. Some FCAS 
features (e.g., greater role of external actors, 
greater openness to institutional reform, 
lower levels of trust within the public system 
and between government and donors) were 
found to favour contractual approaches. The 
review concludes that, rather than emerging 
despite fragility, conditions of fragility may 
favour PBF adoption. 
Less clear are the effects of FCAS contexts 
and features on PBF implementation and on 
PBF effectiveness (Bertone et al., 2018a), 
which seems to be varied across settings 
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and indicators (see for example, on Rwanda 
(Basinga et al., 2011; Sekabaraga et al., 2011), 
DRC (Fox et al., 2014; Huillery and Seban, 
2015; Soeters et al., 2011), Burundi (I Bonfrer 
et al., 2014; Igna Bonfrer et al., 2014; Falisse 
et al., 2014) and Chad (Kiendrébéogo et al., 
2015)).
An analysis of PBF in three humanitarian 
contexts (South Kivu in DRC, Adamawa State 
in Nigeria and Central African Republic) 
points to the need for adaptation in design 
and implementation (instead of a “copy-and-
paste” approach). Factors that may facilitate 
adaptation include organisational flexibility, 
local staff and knowledge, and embedded 
long-term partners (Bertone et al., 2018b). 
PBF is often portrayed as a mechanism for 
strengthening strategic purchasing and 
improving efficiency and equity (Soucat et 
al., 2017). A recent study looked at the PBF’s 
effects on strategic purchasing in three FCAS 
settings (Zimbabwe, northern Uganda, and 
DRC) (Witter et al., 2018a). It concludes that 
these PBF programmes have not brought about 
systematic transformation of purchasing in the 
health sector, and some domains, particularly 
at government level and in relation to the 
population, have not been altered significantly. 
However, partial improvements are noted 
in some domains, such as creating more 
incentives for service delivery and quality 
for some services, while also bringing more 
focus to data quality and enabling national 
policies to improve equity (such as user fee 
removal or reduction) to be at least partially 
implemented. More generally, PBF has been 
a source of much-needed revenue at primary 
care level in under-funded health systems. 
The authors conclude that the evidence 
to date suggests that expectations of RBF 
bringing about widespread transformation in 
the sector should be nuanced and realistic. A 
related political economy analysis of PBF in 
Zimbabwe highlights the importance of active 
local adaptation of financing policies, as well 
as the tension within PBF between supporting 
autonomy and exerting control (Witter et al., 
2018b).
In Burundi, health financing reforms such 
as free healthcare for children under five 
and pregnant women and PBF are reported 
to have contributed to good governance in 
the health sector. The main contributions 
of these reforms to good governance were 
the separation of functions, transparency in 
management and a meticulous description 
of administrative procedures. Scrupulous 
monitoring resulted in several corrective 
measures. However, several unresolved 
questions remain, concerning the integration 
of vertical programmes and the sustainability 
of the system given the considerable costs 
(Peerenboom et al., 2014). Another study on 
the DRC concludes that while there may be a 
role for P4P in fragile contexts, to be effective 
it needs to be rooted in wider financing and 
human resource policy reforms (Fox et al. 
2015).
ACCREDITATION AND REGULATION OF 
PROVIDERS
There is a general lack of published evidence 
on accreditation experiences and on how to 
effectively engage all providers, including 
non-state and informal providers in FCAS 
settings. There is some evidence from 
Liberia on the creation of an (externally led) 
accreditation system as part of the BPHS 
development to identify facilities that had 
the clinical and management standards to 
provide the BPHS (Cleveland et al., 2011).
Non-governmental and private healthcare 
providers have been incorporated into public 
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health systems (either by contracting or by 
informal arrangements) in order to increase 
geographical coverage of healthcare in a 
range of crisis-affected settings (Newbrander 
et al., 2011; Witter and Hunter, 2017c). There 
are two key challenges for this approach. 
First, governments in settings suffering 
protracted crises may have limited capability 
to manage and regulate such providers, 
leading to implementation problems and 
the undermining of state legitimacy. This 
has been reported in Afghanistan and DRC 
(Palmer et al., 2006; Waldman, 2006). 
Second, the growth of non-public providers 
may create sectoral distortions in health 
system resources, for example workforce 
migration to NGOs and private providers. 
Such distortions should be monitored and 
corrective responses introduced as needed 
(Pavignani, 2005).
The size and influence of civil society may be 
limited in crisis-affected settings as a legacy of 
crisis and by restrictive laws. In such settings, 
external support provides vital resources 
and training to develop the monitoring and 
advocacy roles of civil society. For example, 
civil society organisations in Uganda have 
received substantial international support, 
which has enabled them to campaign strongly 
for expansion of access to treatment for HIV 
in spite of a restrictive advocacy environment 
(Rosenquist et al., 2013).
BENEFITS PACKAGES 
Most of the literature from FCAS settings on 
benefits packages has focused on documenting 
experiences of establishing essential health 
care packages, which are often contracted 
out to NGOs, as described above. There 
is also some, but limited literature, on 
approaches to regulation of providers and 
specific considerations relating to health care 
provision during emergencies.
Given resource constraints, governments 
face difficult decisions on essential service 
packages. In conflict-affected settings, 
emergency packages typically focus on 
primary healthcare interventions relating 
to maternal, newborn and child health, 
immunisation, nutrition, mental health 
services and the diagnosis and treatment for 
some communicable and non-communicable 
diseases (Witter and Hunter, 2017a). Services 
for trauma and for sexual and gender-based 
violence are important in conflict-affected 
settings – for example, the emergency package 
in Liberia included counselling, treatment 
and referrals for survivors of sexual violence. 
Providers need to be adequately trained, 
resourced and incentivised to implement the 
chosen services, otherwise the package may 
have little resemblance to services actually 
provided. Those packages can then provide a 
basis for expansion of coverage (WHO, 2014). 
Explicit basic packages of health services 
(BPHS) have been introduced post-conflict in 
countries such as Afghanistan, Liberia, South 
Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Cambodia. They are usually seen 
as helpful to provide clear policies and a sense 
of direction, address geographical inequities, 
and improve alignment of all providers (Eldon 
et al., 2008). Other potential advantages of the 
national roll out of a BPHS in a post-conflict 
setting may be rapid increases in healthcare 
coverage and standardisation of services, 
facilities, staffing, drugs and equipment 
(Ameli and Newbrander, 2008; Loevinsohn 
and Sayed, 2008; Petit et al., 2013; WHO, 
2008), although there are concern about 
services which are not included in BPHS 
(Roberts et al., 2008).
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After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Afghan 
transitional government and international 
donors found the health system near collapse. 
To begin activities that would quickly improve 
the health situation, the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) needed both a national package of 
health services and reliable data on the costs of 
providing those services (Newbrander, 2007).
The objective of the BPHS was to provide a 
bare minimum of essential health services, 
which could be scaled up rapidly through 
contracting mechanisms with NGOs (Frost 
et al., 2016). The package, whose design was 
assisted by donor-funded technical assistance, 
had seven components: maternal and newborn 
health, child health and immunisation, 
nutrition, control of communicable diseases, 
mental health, disability and provision of 
essential drugs. Mental health and disability 
became second tier components, only 
implemented where financial and human 
resources permitted. The MOP agreed that 
the BPHS would be reviewed within two years 
to adjust the content of the package based on 
its effectiveness in addressing health needs 
(Newbrander et al., 2014). The cost of the 
BPHS was estimated at US$4.55 per person in 
2002 (Newbrander, 2007). 
Afghanistan is the longest-running example of 
BPHS contracting in a conflict-affected setting 
and it is extensively documented (Howard 
et al., 2014). Its reported effects include 
that access to and utilisation of primary 
health care services in rural areas increased 
dramatically, the number of BPHS facilities 
more than doubled; access for women to 
basic health care improved; more deliveries 
were attended by skilled personnel; supply of 
essential medicines increased; and the health 
information system became more functional 
(Newbrander et al., 2014). The experience 
suggests that access to health services can be 
extended through contracting mechanisms in 
a post-conflict state even in the presence of 
security problems (Ameli and Newbrander, 
2008). However, other assessments are less 
positive. One finds that, despite the good 
intentions of the BPHS, not enough has been 
done to overcome the barriers to accessing 
its services and that overall service coverage 
remains low. High costs and the inability to 
afford treatment was the reason that 50% of 
Afghani survey respondents in 2004–5 gave 
for not seeking treatment. In 2004 almost 
65% of the total expenditure on health in 
Afghanistan was incurred as out-of-pocket 
payments by households. This rose to between 
72% and 79% of the total expenditure on 
health in 2006 (Frost et al., 2016). 
In Liberia, as in other post-conflict countries, 
the recovery of the health sector was initiated 
through a Basic Package of Health Services 
(BPHS) approach. The government and 
partners, including international donors, 
contracted international and local NGOs 
to deliver the BPHS, as highlighted above. 
An analysis of the stakeholder perceptions 
finds that “health workers had a limited 
understanding of the BPHS and associated 
it with low salaries, difficult working 
conditions, and limited support from policy 
makers. Health workers responded by sub-
optimal delivery of certain services (such 
as facility-based deliveries), parallel private 
services, and leaving their posts. These 
responses risk distorting and undermining 
the BPHS implementation. There were also 
clear differences in the perspectives of health 
workers and policy makers on the BPHS 
implementation. These findings suggest the 
need for greater dialogue between policy 
makers and health workers to improve 
understanding of the BPHS and recognition 
of the working conditions in order to help 
achieve the potential benefits of the BPHS in 
Liberia” (Petit et al., 2013).
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SERVICE DELIVERY DURING 
EMERGENCIES
The traditional paradigm emphasized 
that health financing, governance and 
service delivery were likely to be operated 
independently of government during 
emergencies, with a large emphasis on 
operating through NGOs (Brinkerhoff, 2008; 
Newbrander et al., 2011), however, the 
emergence of more protracted and complex 
emergencies has reinforced the need for 
multiple strategies, utilizing and building 
more on indigenous capacities and systems 
and allowing for smoother entry and exit of 
international organisations. In Timor-Leste, 
international NGO efforts were initially critical 
to providing relief efforts to a traumatized 
population. However, later on, the cost of 
their support was seen as unsustainable 
and a hand-over plan was designed by local 
authorities. Since then, some NGOs have 
worked collaboratively with the Ministry 
of Health, showing that transition of NGO 
support from crisis to development is feasible 
within a national planning process (Alonso 
and Brugha, 2006; Mercer et al., 2014).
For IDPs or refugees in countries that have a 
more established health system and are not 
totally open to allow refugees to integrate 
into that, traditionally this has resulted in 
the creation of a parallel (externally funded, 
and free at the point of delivery) system 
for refugees, separate from that of the host 
communities. However, this has increased 
fragmentation and created challenges and 
disparities. Spiegel et al. (2018) argue that 
‘’the current modalities used to fund refugee 
emergencies are not sustainable and will 
worsen as health needs increase and health 
services become more expensive, particularly 
in middle-income countries. New sources of 
funding and innovative financing instruments 
are needed”. They argue that the guiding 
approach should be that “ultimately, the goal 
is to integrate refugees into a host country’s 
functioning national health system, even when 
that system is delivering worse outcomes than 
the parallel system for refugees. However, if 
national health systems are not functioning or 
those systems are overwhelmed, particularly 
at the beginning of an acute emergency, then 
parallel systems may need to be established” 
(Spiegel et al., 2018). Direct contracts with 
private providers or national NGOs to cover 
health care costs of vulnerable households in 
contexts like the war in Syria have also been 
used by some international agencies recently, 
although evidence of effectiveness and costs 
is not yet available. The risk however is that 
humanitarian systems add to national health 
system fragmentation, as highlighted in 
Lebanon (Blanchet et al., 2016). 
Promising recent examples of more integrated 
approaches in the region should also be 
examined and shared, including in countries 
which are not recognized as FCAS but host 
substantial displaced and refugee populations 
(and so are indirectly conflict-affected). For 
example, a current multi-donor programme 
is funding specific government health budget 
lines for poor uninsured host populations and 
refugees in Jordan, subject to external (to the 
Ministry of Health) but domestic verification 
(Montenegro Torres, 2018). This holds 
promise in that it uses existing funding and 
provision mechanisms and works through 
local institutions. 
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There is a very large literature on mechanisms 
to mobilise and coordinate external funding, 
and in particular those relevant to (and 
likely to be more effective in) the early 
recovery phase in FCAS settings. Many 
recommendations focus on ensuring that 
humanitarian assistance links effectively with 
more long-term development engagement 
and ensures long-term national institutional 
and health systems development is supported 
when setting up mechanisms for channelling 
humanitarian assistance (WHO, 2009).
The ‘Grand Bargain’ signed at the 2016 
World Humanitarian Forum includes 51 
commitments within nine themes: 1) Greater 
transparency; 2) More support and funding 
tools to local and national responders; 
3) Increase the use and coordination of 
cash-based programming; 4) Reduce 
duplication and management costs with 
periodic functional reviews; 5) Improve 
joint and impartial needs assessments; 6) 
A participation revolution: include people 
receiving aid in making the decisions which 
affect their lives; 7) Increase collaborative 
humanitarian multi-year planning and 
funding; 8) Reduce the earmarking of donor 
contributions; and 9) Harmonize and simplify 
reporting requirements (IASC, 2016). The 
IASC Humanitarian Development Nexus 
Task Team has developed its own typology 
for engagement, which considers similar 
domains to Call 2011, linked to responsibility, 
capacity and security (IASC Humanitarian 
Development Nexus Task Team, n.d.). 
Emergency and humanitarian settings 
present particular health and health system 
challenges, for which WHO has established 
procedures (WHO, 2013). WHO’s Protracted 
Emergency Framework (Draft, 2016) suggests 
the following objectives for the collective 
response to emergencies beyond the first 3-6 
months (or where no shift to full recovery is 
foreseeable):
1.  Progressively expand access, coverage 
and quality of an Essential Package of 
Health Services (EPHS) to populations at 
risk, 
2.  Progressively shift from a focus on service 
delivery by supporting health facilities to 
an area and population based approach 
through District Health Management 
(DHM) supported by community 
engagement;
3.  Strengthen capacities to detect and respond 
to outbreaks of infectious diseases;
4.  Strengthen capacities of MOH and health 
partners to prepare for, respond to and 
recover from emergencies arising from all 
hazards during the protracted emergency;
5.  Use the health system analysis framework 
to identify priorities and opportunities 
for early recovery to connect with longer 
term health system recovery and reforms;
6.  Strengthen national and subnational 
capacity for coordination of humanitarian 
partners and district health management, 
and creating links with development 
health partners;
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7.  Develop or update a health transition 
strategy that addresses humanitarian, 
recovery and development needs, and 
their interactions.
The framework also articulates the synergies 
between early recovery activities and 
longer term health system reconstruction 
approaches.
There are however risks to linking 
humanitarian work too closely with wider 
political objectives, such as state-building, and 
some highlight the importance of retaining 
principles of impartiality and focus on delivery 
of direct benefits to vulnerable people so as to 
avoid politicization and linked risks to health 
staff (Philips and Derderian, 2015). 
While all donors have their own risk profile 
and approach to fragility, and each country 
context is unique, the most cited desirable 
attribute for support to post-conflict 
countries is flexibility (Manuel et al., 2012). 
A DFID paper also emphasizes the need 
for experimentation, supported by long-
term commitment, good monitoring and 
evaluation, money, and above all dedicated 
staff (Leader and Colenso, 2005). Given the 
often fast-changing and volatile contexts, 
being able to respond in an agile manner is 
also important to effectiveness, whatever 
the sector. The focus is on finding best fit to 
context, more than necessarily what is seen 
internationally as ‘best practice’ (Ramalingam 
et al., 2014). Risks are likely to be higher and 
adaptive planning and budgeting are needed, 
along with a willingness to work across 
contested lines and to accept set-backs as well 
as successes.
Although individual case studies are often 
contested, with diverging views of their 
achievements and limitations, some general 
principles emerge, including the need for 
a real but realistic role for the Ministry of 
Health, which is widely shared by all parties; 
strong donor coordination and alignment to 
reduce transaction costs and fragmentation; 
participatory decision making across actors 
and levels of the health system; focusing 
on results and performance monitoring 
of health-sector activities using multiple 
data sources; increasing the reliability of 
aid flows, ideally for sufficient periods to 
support system strengthening; and ensuring 
a critical mass of individuals with the right 
experience and expertise being deployed 
at the right time and able to look beyond 
agency mandates and priorities to support 
sector reform and results (Dalil et al., 2014). 
These have also been highlighted in reviews 
of global health initiatives operating in FCAS 
settings (Bornemisza et al., 2010; Pearson et 
al., 2014; Witter and Pavignani, 2016). Given 
the challenge of legitimacy and capacity, it is 
particularly important that heath policies are 
not (nor seen as) externally devised (Gruber, 
2009). A long-term presence is also likely to 
be needed, to provide space for the creation, 
sustenance, and maturation of institutions 
that are able to undergird the state (Chand 
and Coffman, 2008). It is also important, 
where legitimate authorities exist, to reinforce 
government stewardship and capacity (and 
avoiding bad practices, such as triggering 
brain drain and distortion through per diems) 
(Witter, 2012).
Much of the literature on development 
cooperation in FCAS settings – not specific 
to health financing or even health, but with 
pertinence to both – emphasizes the need to 
be more sensitive to the political economy 
of the situation (see Box 4). For example, a 
World Bank report on working in conflicted 
settings highlights the need for development 
partners to become better at diagnosing the 
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A	number	of	fragile	and	conflict-affected	countries	(and	more	specifically,	post-conflict	countries)	
have	regularly	featured	in	relation	to	health	financing	reforms.	This	is	the	case,	for	example,	for	
Afghanistan	 (contracting,	BPHS,	 trust	 fund	arrangements,	piloting	of	vouchers	and	demand-
side	financing	mechanisms)	(Loevinsohn	and	Sayed,	2008),	Cambodia	(contracting,	performance-
based	 financing,	 community	 health	 insurance,	 health	 equity	 funds,	 demand-side	 financing)	
(Ensor	 et	 al.,	 2017),	 Rwanda	 (performance-based	 financing,	mutuelles,	 fiscal	 decentralization)	
(Sekabaraga	 et	 al.,	 2011)	 and	 Liberia	 (health	 pooled	 fund,	 contracting,	 BPHS,	 accreditation,	
performance-based	financing)	(Sondorp	and	Coolen,	2012).	During	the	post-conflict	phase,	these	
countries	appear	to	have	been	health	financing	‘innovators’.	In	these	settings,	health	financing	
reforms	have	often	been	interrelated	packages,	adapted	to	their	context	and	designed	to	work	
in	complementarity	with	one	another.
An	important,	though	under-explored	question,	is	why	some	countries	(rather	than	others)	have	
been	multiple	reformers	and	what	are	the	driving	factors	of	these	reforms.	One	hypothesis	relates	
to	the	existence	of	‘windows	of	opportunity’	for	reform	in	the	post-conflict	period	due	to	the	
disruptive	effects	of	conflict,	the	political	energy	released	by	the	change	of	regime,	the	fluidity	
of	the	situation	with	new	players	and	ideas	entering	the	political	arena,	and	increased	funding	
available	(Bertone	et	al.,	2014;	Kurtenbach,	2009;	Pavignani	and	Colombo,	2009).	However,	this	
would	not	explain	why	some	post-conflict	countries	are	‘better	innovators’	compared	to	others.	
Additionally,	 there	 is	 little	 empirical	 evidence	 supporting	 this	 hypothesis,	 and	 some	 studies	
have	shown	that	 the	 immediate	post-conflict	period	may	not	promote	 innovation	as	political	
uncertainty	and	fragmentation	are	unlikely	to	produce	big,	non-incremental	change	(Bertone	
et	al.,	2014;	Pavignani,	2011;	Witter	et	al.,	2016a).	The	timing	and	feature	of	the	peace	process	
(for	example,	a	prolonged	transition	or	the	sudden	onset	of	peace)	and	the	political	settlements	
that	emerged	at	the	end	of	the	conflict	and	the	type	of	regime	(the	emergence	of	a	stable	and	
legitimate	government,	rather	than	continuing	cycles	of	protracted	fragility	and	conflict)	may	
also	play	a	significant	role	in	explaining	differences	between	countries	(Witter	et	al.,	2016a).	
So	 far,	 few	empirical	studies	have	 looked	at	 this	question	and	 investigated	the	dynamics	and	
the	political	 economy	of	 health	financing	 reforms	 in	 relation	 to	 FCAS	 settings.	 The	 few	 case	
studies	which	do	highlight	the	role	of	external	actors,	such	as	international	donors	and	NGOs,	in	
influencing	policy-making	processes	not	only	in	relation	to	funding	(often	related	to	geo-political	
considerations)	and	aid	modalities	that	they	bring,	but	also	in	terms	of	ideas	and	influence	that	
they	exert,	especially	in	settings	where	governments	are	under-resourced	and	capacity	is	weak.	
This	is	highlighted	with	reference	to	Kosovo	(Percival	and	Sondorp,	2010),	Afghanistan	(Robert,	
2012),	South	Sudan	(Cometto	et	al.,	2010),	as	well	as	Sierra	Leone	(Bertone	et	al.,	2018c).	Recent	
research	on	the	political	economy	of	PBF	introduction	in	Zimbabwe	stressed	the	role	of	donors,	
but	 also	 showed	 how,	 despite	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 crisis,	 the	 retained	managerial	 and	
professional	capacity	(a	feature	that	distinguishes	Zimbabwe	from	many	other	FCAS	settings)	
allowed	for	more	adaptation	and	contributed	to	created	national	ownership	over	time	(Witter	et	
al.,	2018b).	
Box 4: What	makes	some	fragile	settings	health	financing	‘innovators’?
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real scope for progress, thinking and working 
more politically, tailoring interventions to 
different forms of violence, taking bargaining 
dynamics more seriously, realigning internal 
donor rules and incentives, and exploring 
new models of delivery and research (World 
Bank, 2017a). 
Witter and Pavignani (2016) distinguish 
between different types of intervention in 
health systems, which may be appropriate in 
different contexts. The first two approaches 
are likely to be more common in FCAS settings, 
which is entirely legitimate if circumstances 
demand this. 
1.  Preventing systems under severe stress 
from collapsing makes their recovery 
easier and faster
2.  Supporting is contingent: better 
performance lasts until inputs are 
discontinued
3.  Strengthening equips the system to 
perform better on its own
4.  Pursuing resilience and sustainability 
implies a longer, more sophisticated 
engagement
Given the demands of these ‘challenging 
operating environments’, they argue for a 
greater focus on systems for health, which 
link communities and informal systems 
with formal systems; for moving external 
engagement closer to service delivery levels, 
especially when conditions are varied across 
a polity and political blockages exist at 
national level; for more flexible and localized 
monitoring and assessment; and for more 
regional (cross-country) approaches where 
crises extend beyond borders.
47gaps In knowledge
The literature on health financing in fragile 
states focuses quite heavily on some countries 
– Afghanistan being by far the most highly 
documented – while others receive very little 
attention. Equally, some topics have received 
much more research attention than others, with 
aid coordination dominating, and some topics 
such as purchasing, quality of care, provider 
regulation, resource allocation, efficiency, and 
data and financial management systems are 
either totally or relatively neglected, perhaps 
because these are seen as less urgent issues 
in FCAS settings. They are however arguably 
equally or more critical to health financing 
and systems performance here.
It is also important to note the variable quality 
of studies reviewed, as noted previously in 
Witter (2012). Many are hampered by poor 
data quality, given the challenging settings 
(Woodward et al., 2016), and a significant 
proportion are conducted by designers and 
implementers of health financing reforms 
and are therefore not independent. Many 
are commissioned by external agencies and 
there is therefore likely a neglect of smaller, 
local and more home-grown reforms. The 
literature on fragile and post-conflict settings 
also tends to be distinct from that oriented 
towards humanitarian settings, mirroring 
organisational and funding differences. 
Areas which would benefit from analysis in 
future, emerging from this review, include:
Resource raising and pooling:
  Empirical analysis of trends at country-
level in aid and internal financing for 
health in FCAS settings. What drives 
these trends over time? What are the 
consequences? How do they relate to the 
broader governance and political context 
(e.g., capacity to manage funds and 
coordinate donors)?
  Analysis of domestic resource mobilization 
which may be particularly suited to health 
in FCAS settings and financing incidence 
here more generally
  Assessment of ‘innovative’ financing tools 
such as social impact bonds and use of 
cash transfers for health-specific purposes
Purchasing:
  Documentation of reforms to strengthen 
and defragment health care purchasing 
arrangements in FCAS settings
  Understanding how to increase population 
engagement in priority setting and 
enforcing entitlements
  More documentation of experiences of 
joint purchasing for refugees, displaced 
populations and host communities
Benefits packages:
  Analysis of specific challenges for quality 
of care and approaches to managing them 
in FCAS settings
  Developing dynamic costing models 
to support service delivery in rapidly 
changing contexts
  Better understanding of the challenges 
and options for regulation of the mixed 
provider landscape in different FCAS 
settings
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Cross cutting:
  Equity analysis of health coverage in 
FCAS settings specifically 
  Analysis through case studies of how health 
financing design and implementation can 
convey social values and contribute to 
social resilience in FCAS settings
  Investigation of how to strengthen PFM 
and health financing data systems in 
FCAS settings
  Analysis of successful experiences in 
bridging humanitarian and development 
health financing modalities
  Analysis of the impact of health financing 
reforms on efficiency
  Understanding and managing the political 
economy of health financing reforms in 
FCAS settings
  Longitudinal studies of health financing 
institutional development and its 
determinants in FCAS settings
  Assessment of strategies to prevent and 
reduce corruption in FCAS settings
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Our data analysis has shown that, as would be 
expected, FCAS countries have significantly 
higher out of pocket expenditure, 
external dependency and health-related 
impoverishment (using both thresholds). 
They also have lower mean government 
expenditure on health in relation to wider 
government expenditure and total health 
expenditure. However, much of this is driven 
by the tendency of FCAS to be low income; 
when stratified, there are fewer clear 
difference at low income levels, whereas 
external dependence and impoverishment 
remain significantly higher for upper-middle 
income FCAS, perhaps indicating the effects 
of shocks. 
Conflict-affected countries within the FCAS 
grouping show similar patterns but more 
accentuated, with less external support and 
lower overall expenditure on health. Chronic 
FCAS countries (those in this category for 
more than five years) showed similar patterns 
to the wider group. 
Trends analysis shows some improvement 
in FCAS performance on health financing 
indicators over recent years, but from 
generally lower starting points and with 
regional variations. In terms of UHC 
coverage, FCAS have lower performance 
for all income levels. 
It is clear that there are substantial challenges 
for health financing in FCAS settings but 
also that considerable ingenuity has also 
been shown in addressing them, albeit 
often externally driven. It is also important 
to highlight that many models have been 
developed and road-tested in FCAS settings 
– approaches like performance-based 
contracting and PBF emerged to a large extent 
out of the need to innovate in FCAS, and have 
since been applied in wider contexts. The 
literature highlights that crises often lead to 
innovation, and that innovations can leave a 
longer legacy (the issue of path dependency), 
which reinforces the need to use crises well.
In drawing conclusions, it is important to 
highlight again the heterogeneity of FCAS 
settings and the need to focus on each context 
as unique, with its particular challenges, 
opportunities and history. While there are some 
shared features, our analysis of overall datasets 
demonstrates the variation in performance on 
most health financing indicators, and also that 
many FCAS countries share features with low 
income countries generally. 
Given this, the guiding principles for health 
financing reforms in support of universal 
health coverage (Kutzin et al., 2017) still apply 
in FCAS settings – in fact, even more so, given 
the greater severity of the challenges that they 
often face, such as fragmentation, complexity 
and volatility of funds, for example. However, 
their operationalization may need to be 
different and achieving them may take a longer 
or more staged journey – for example, moving 
from unregulated fees for service to flat fees, 
to increase predictability of payments, before 
gradually shifting more systematically away 
for out of pocket payments for core health 
services. Similarly, in some settings donors 
may be unable to work through government 
but can move toward better coordination 
with government to avoid fragmentation 
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and service gaps. Within Ministries, the 
development of project implementation units 
with semi-autonomy is arguably another such 
transitional mechanism, aiming to fill short 
term capacity gaps while offering a route to 
their longer term strengthening.
Given the regional nature of many conflicts 
and shocks, health financing analysis and 
support may be needed at regional level – 
for example in the EMRO region, where all 
countries are either directly or indirectly 
affected by conflict – as well as at national 
and sub-national levels. The focus should 
be on tailored strategies, which build 
on international learning but are closely 
contextualised and able to adapt. The only 
certainty is change, and building capacity to 
manage change is critical. 
Although FCAS settings go through different 
phases, such as pre-crisis, reacting to crisis, 
stabilisation and recovery, many now face 
chronic problems and complex emergencies, 
in which strategies for humanitarian 
response and development converge. 
Lessons on contracting health care provision 
and insurance models are just some examples 
of areas where this convergence is occurring 
and can be further pursued. This is important 
to managing transitions.
Important messages emerging from this 
review include the following:
  All FCAS settings have health financing 
challenges but those which combine 
deficits in security, capacity and 
legitimacy are most extreme and require 
support which is adaptable, long term and 
politically astute.
  Political economy considerations are 
important in all settings but FCAS often 
require particular sensitivity, given the 
underlying factors fuelling fragility, and 
typically include a larger role for external 
actors. 
  Strategies in these areas need to be 
based on understanding the internal and 
external agency incentives, looking for 
politically feasible improvements, even 
where not optimal, and enabling work 
across politically contested areas.
  Many of the health financing challenges 
are linked to this configuration, 
with external actors adding to the 
fragmentation of policies and practices 
in many cases – hence the importance of 
coordination, even if direct relationships 
with governments are constrained.
  In some of these settings (e.g. acute 
crises or gradual collapse of functions), 
appropriate goals for health financing 
may be not so much advancing UHC but 
preventing loss of gains – for example, 
preventing a reversal of financial 
protection as budgets collapse and out of 
pocket payments replace them. 
  Support needs to be tailored to regional, 
national and sub-national levels, including 
for specific vulnerable populations, such 
as refugees and other displaced people, 
who typically have higher health needs 
(such as mental health) and may have 
more limited entitlements and access.
  In chronic emergency settings where 
wider institutional structures exist, 
humanitarian and development assistance 
should aim to pool risks (e.g. through the 
local social insurance mechanism) and 
provide service coverage (e.g. through 
purchasing contracts with relevant 
providers) through these structures 
as far as possible, investing in longer 
term institutional capacity and avoiding 
parallel systems. During acute crises, this 
may not possible but even in these settings 
distortions can be minimised.
51conclusIon and fInal reflectIons
  Recognising the importance of stable 
funding flows, more advocacy is needed 
for continued, predictable and (where 
possible) integrated external funding, 
with external partners refocusing their 
aid and support on those in most need 
globally.
  Further pooling of donor support, 
including harmonizing financial 
management, human resource and other 
procedures across donors, implementing 
agencies and districts, including through 
shadow alignment where needed, is 
recommended.
  Given higher levels of resource scarcity in 
many FCAS settings, coupled with high 
need, there is an even higher need than 
usual to focus resources on priority services 
(focused on vulnerable populations, with 
cost-effective services). The development 
of essential service packages is common 
in FCAS settings, and can form the basis 
for pooled funding by government and 
donors.
  In the context of underlying economic 
and social challenges, displacement and 
conflict and other crises, households’ 
ability to access and pay for health care 
is typically reduced in FCAS settings, 
and attention to reducing financial and 
non-financial barriers is key; reports 
of reintroduction of fees in response 
to dwindling external support are 
concerning as populations are already 
bearing too high a burden in terms of out-
of-pocket payments. 
  The consensus on removing user fees in 
humanitarian crises is important in this 
context, but there are risks of difficult 
transitions when areas or populations 
emerge from acute crises, leading to loss 
of financial protection, coverage and 
health. Policies to extend protection and 
smooth transitions are important.
  There is an increased focus on cash 
transfers in general in development, 
however in the health sector unconditional 
cash transfers need to be combined with 
well-designed provider payments so 
that quality of care and appropriate care 
packages are offered (focused on those 
in need but also emphasising preventive 
health and public health measures). 
Unconditional cash transfers are more 
suited to addressing demand-side barriers, 
such as transport.
  Given the high likelihood of shocks, it 
is important to learn from the resilience 
literature on distributed capacity and plan 
health financing systems accordingly. 
Being better prepared for crisis may 
also include, for example, having basic 
packages established and costed, with 
draft contracts, so that governments 
and donors can react more quickly to 
shocks of various kinds; also having 
simple but functional systems for tracking 
expenditures and resource flows in the 
health system in place.
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71annexes
An initial consultation on delivering health 
financing technical assistance in fragile and 
conflict-affected situations was organised 
by the WHO Health Financing Team in 
Geneva on 13th November 2017. The meeting 
brought together health financing focal 
points from AFRO and EMRO, the WHO 
Health Financing Team, and representatives 
from the Health Emergencies Programme 
and the Department of Service Delivery and 
Safety. External representatives included 
the UHC 2030 Working Group on “Support 
to countries with fragile or challenging 
operating environments technical”, Providing 
4 Health (Health Financing Consortium), 
ReBUILD research consortium and the World 
Bank. 
This meeting was followed by more in-depth 
consultation led by the WHO EMRO office 
in May 2018, focussed on health financing 
in chronic and acute emergencies. More 
than 30 participants attended, including 
WHO regional, head office and country level 
experts, representatives from other partners 
such as the Global Fund, Ministry of Health 
representatives from the region, academic 
experts and consultants specialising in health 
financing support in FCAS contexts. 
The paper is based on the insights and 
experience of the authors, augmented by 
insights from the consultative meetings, 
quantitative data analysis and review of the 
literature, in which data from 168 published 
and grey documents were extracted. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
LITERATURE SEARCH 
A purposeful, non-systematic literature search 
was carried out with an iterative approach. 
We started from a general database search 
on PubMed and Scopus using the following 
key words: (“conflict” OR “post-conflict” 
OR “reconstruction” OR “fragile”) AND 
(“financing” OR “systems” OR “performance” 
OR “research” OR “user fees” OR “exemptions” 
OR “budgeting” OR “equity” OR “access” OR 
“performance-based” OR “output-based” OR 
“pay for performance” OR “incentives” OR 
“resource allocation” OR “public expenditure” 
OR “contracting” OR “public/private” OR 
“global health initiatives” OR “aid” OR 
“funding” OR “budgeting”) AND “health”. 
This resulted in 35,294 entries from PubMed 
and about 20,000 from Scopus. Since Scopus 
results can be ordered by relevance, only this 
result list was further considered and the first, 
most relevant 1,000 entries were screed (title 
first and abstract if necessary). As a result, a 
total of 85 documents were included based 
on a list of inclusion/exclusion criteria (see 
below), reviewed and relevant information 
and data from them were extracted.
As a second step, we focused our literature 
search on topics which were identified as 
particularly relevant and/or on which there 
were gaps in the documents. Additionally, 
targeted searches also included specialist 
journals and series (Conflict & Health, 
Disasters), institutional websites (ReBUILD, 
UHC 2013, WHO, WB, KIT) and suggestions 
from experts, as well as focusing specifically 
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on the ‘fragile’ countries5 for which no 
information had been yet retrieved. In 
total, 61 new documents were included and 
reviewed.
At the end of the literature search, a total of 
168 documents were identified, reviewed 
and included in the data extraction form. 
Inclusion/exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria were kept purposefully 
loose as our aim was to capture a vast range 
of issues and papers. 
  Only documents referring to FCAS 
countries or multi-country papers 
including at least one FCAS are included. 
FCAS are broadly defined based on 
the WB harmonised list from the years 
2007 to 2017 (Annex 3). Countries were 
considered FCAS for the purpose of the 
documentary review if included in the list 
for one year or more during the period. 
Additionally, other countries such as 
Rwanda, Pakistan, (northern) Uganda, 
Ukraine are also included because the 
countries (or areas within them) were 
considered fragile at the time when the 
research reported in the document was 
carried out. 
  In contrast to the approach of the 2012 
review (Witter, 2012), all documents 
referring to FCAS setting were included, 
both in the case they included a specific 
reference to the fragile/conflict/post-
conflict situation and/or discussed the 
findings explicitly in relation to the 
FCAS setting, but also when they did not 
mention fragility/conflict explicitly or did 
so only in passing. A note of this was made 
5	 	The	definition	of	FCAS	countries	is	based	on	the	World	
Bank Harmonized List for 2007-2017 (see Annex 3).
in the data extraction form.
  Again, in contrast to the 2012 review, 
documents referring to humanitarian 
responses, conflict period, emergencies 
and transition were also included.
  Only documents referring to at least one 
dimension/aspect of health financing 
(even in passing in a more general health 
system paper) were included. This means 
that documents referring to other HRH or 
information systems or other pillars were 
excluded. 
DATA EXTRACTION
A data extraction matrix was prepared in 
advance (Table 12) which aimed to capture 
the broader information concerning the 
documents (authors, type of publication, 
country of reference, etc.). One of the 
information it aimed to capture were also the 
“main elements of health financing” to which 
the document referred to, as well as the 
specific “theme” which was discussed in the 
document. For both these categories, a pre-
defined set of responses was prepared (Table 
13) which later allowed for a comparison 
of the main financing elements and themes 
discussed across documents. Additional, 
open-ended entries referred to the “key 
findings” and the “findings in relation to 
fragility, conflict and post-conflict”. 
Data and information were extracted from all 
168 documents using this matrix. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Bibliometric analysis was carried out to explore 
the document sources, year of publication, 
country/region of focus, as well as health 
financing element and theme described. 
Secondly, the data extraction matrix was 
analysed comparatively by looking at each 
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Table 12: Main	elements	of	the	data	extraction	matrix
Author
Title
Publication	type	/	Journal
Year 
Source	(Scopus,	targeted	searches,	snowballing)
Research	methods 
Country/region
Main	element	of	health	financing	(see	list	below)
Theme	(see	list	below)
Key	findings
Findings/comments/discussion	linked	to	fragility,	conflict,	post-conflict	setting	(or	no	reference	to	it)
Relevant	references	/	comments	
“health financing element” and “theme” in 
turn (for example, “revenue raising/pooling 
– user fees exemptions” or “purchasing – 
contracting” or “health and state-building/
peace”, and so on). In this way, information 
was collated and key findings charted across 
different documents in order to look for 
patterns, differences and similarities across 
countries and regions.
LIMITATIONS
We were purposefully broad in terms of 
inclusion criteria in order to be able to capture 
as much as possible of the ongoing debates. 
Additionally, the literature is vast and appears 
to have been growing over the last few years. 
Therefore, our literature search and review is 
not (and does not aim to be) systematic and 
we acknowledge that a number of documents 
may have been overlooked, despite several 
iterations in the search and expert advice. 
However, we believe it has captured the key 
debates and issues. 
There were no checks in place or scoring 
system to assess the quality of the documents 
retrieved. Indeed, the quality of the research 
presented seemed to vary and documents 
include rigorous empirical research as well 
as descriptive viewpoint or editorial articles. 
Additionally, many of the documents were 
authored by researchers with some stake 
in the issue being presented (e.g., MoH or 
donor agencies’ staff, consultants, technical 
assistants, etc. presenting the results of a 
project/programme they were also directly 
implementing, managing, supervising or 
funding). When possible, this has been noted 
in the data extraction form.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Based on the WHO data available (WHO, 
2018), we examine associations of FCAS 
status with a range of health financing and 
health service coverage outcomes (Table 14).
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Table 13: Predefined	codes	for	“main	element	of	health	financing”	and	“theme”
Main element of 
health financing
Theme ( sub-themes that are included)
Revenue	raising	/	
pooling
Public	spending	
		tax	mobilisation	level,	progressiveness,	govt	allocation	to	health	sector
Key	features	/	
challenges
Private spending
	(OOPS,	catastrophic	expenditures,	informal	payments,	etc.
External aid 
		trends	in	aid	levels,	aid	dependency,	coping	with	too	little	or	too	much	
funding,	aid	coordination	and	effectiveness,	influence	of	external	
actors
Tax	revenue	mobilization		 Options	for	policy	
and	practice
Insurance	/	mutuelles
User fees exemptions and targeted exemptions
Health	Equity	Funds
Aid	coordination	mechanisms
		Health	Pooled	Funds	/	Multi-donor	Trust	Funds	/	technical	assistance	/	
etc.	+	transitional	funds
Purchasing	 Passive	purchasing	
	fragmented	purchasing,	or	no	purchasing	at	all	
Key	features	/	
challenges
Efficiency	
Contracting	
	contracting	in,	contracting	out
Options	for	policy	
and	practice
PBF
Role	of	the	private	sector	/	non-state	actors
Demand-side	financing
Benefit	packages	&	
service	provision
Awareness	of	entitlements	and	entitlements	not	matching	with	provider	
payments	(lack	thereof)
Key	features	/	
challenges
Regulation,	especially	of	non-state	providers	(lack	thereof)
BPHS Options	for	policy	
and	practice
Regulating	providers,	accreditation	systems,	etc.
NGOs
	role	in	service	provision,	coordination	(or	not)	at	local	level,	etc.
Cross-cutting	issues Governance	
		Transparency	and	accountability,	capacity	of	local	institutions,	legitimacy	of	the	state,	policy	
processes	and	windows	of	opportunity,	path	dependency	
Health	and	state-building	/	health	and	peace
PFM 
		Fragmented	PFM	/	cash	flows	and	procurement	done	in	parallel,	input-based	budgeting,	lack	
of	links	between	plans	and	expenditure,	etc.
Equity
Humanitarian	contexts	
		funding	care	for	vulnerable	groups,	refugees,	IDPs	and	migrants	(user	fees	exemption,	
innovative	mechanisms,	etc.)
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DEFINITION OF FCAS
We included in the analysis any country 
included in the World Bank’s harmonized list 
(Annex 3) which was considered FCAS for at 
least one year over the 2012-2014 period. 
We recognize that the FCAS definition is 
debatable and dynamic. Therefore, we also 
carried out the same analysis with two 
different definitions of FCAS: (i) including 
countries featuring in the FCAS list for more 
than 5 consecutive years in the 2007-2017 
period, indicating chronic or protracted 
crises (see Annex 3, fcas_chronic) and (ii) 
including countries featured in groups A and 
B of the security dimension in OECD 2016 
‘States of fragility’ report (i.e., extreme and 
high insecurity) (OECD, 2016), meant to 
represent a subset of countries affected by 
active conflict and severe violence (see Annex 
3, fcas_conflict2016). We noted that the 
results did not fundamentally change with 
the changing definition of FCAS, so that our 
analysis is relatively robust in terms of FCAS 
definition.
DATA ANALYSIS
We use bar charts to visualise the data 
across the FCAS countries for each outcome 
and compare to mean FCAS and mean non-
FCAS values. We use t-tests to compare mean 
values for each outcome ((i) FCAS versus 
all non-FCAS countries available for each 
outcome measure) and highlight statistically 
significant differences. We further test FCAS 
versus non-FCAS:
(ii)  by income status (low, upper middle, 
lower middle, high income – (World 
Bank, 2018c)
(iii)  by WHO region. 
Table 14: Summary	of	outcomes	considered	and	year(s)	of	reference
Outcome Year(s) of reference
GGEH	%	GGE Average	(2012-2014)*
GGHE-D	%	CHE Average	(2012-2014)
EXT	%	CHE Average	(2012-2014)
CHE	%	GDP Average	(2012-2014)
OOP	%	CHE Average	(2012-2014)
UHC	index	of	essential	service	coverage 2015** 
Catastrophic	expenditures*** Last	year	available	(varies	for	each	country)
Impoverishing	expenditures*** Last	year	available	(varies	for	each	country)
Note: 
* last 3-year period available; 
**  only year available
***	 	Note	that	data	for	catastrophic	and	impoverishing	expenditure	is	limited	in	availability,	only	available	in	specific	countries	in	specific	
years. Additionally, the limitation for both of these data sources is that the FCAS status does not necessarily match up with the 
outcome	data	available.	For	consistency	across	outcome	measures,	we	defined	FCAS	for	the	same	country	list	as	for	all	other	
outcome measures (see below), and compare the last available year of data for each individual country.
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There has been a growing focus on fragile 
states since 2000, with a wide variety of 
interpretations of the concept by academics 
and international agencies. A systematic 
review of fragility and health, for example, 
shows an exponential growth of studies from 
2001, apparently peaking in 2015 (Figure 8).
DEFINITIONS AND DRIVERS
There is no single agreed definition (Annex 2) 
but common elements across the definitions 
used include a focus on gaps in relation to 
three dimensions:
1.  Government’s capacity and willingness 
to ensure provision of basic services 
to its population (especially vulnerable 
groups).
2. Its legitimacy.
Its ability to provide security and stability 
(survival functions) (Witter et al., 2015).
CAPACITY AND WILLINGNESS
The health sector is most obviously affected 
by the first, service delivery-oriented domain, 
but the domains connect, in that in the absence 
of security and a trusted public authority, 
ANNEX 2:  
DEFINING FRAGILITY
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Figure 8: Studies	identified	on	fragility	and	health
Source: Diaconu et al, 2019
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sustained and effective service delivery will 
not be possible. 
The service delivery function includes wide-
ranging components, such as effectiveness, 
capacity to execute policies, capacities in 
stewardship, coordination, and leadership, 
institutional capacity, and the achievement of 
equity of services across populations (Witter 
et al., 2015). Service provision is a highly 
political issue: by delivering services the state 
makes itself visible, strengthens its social 
contract and increases its legitimacy with its 
citizens (Eldon et al., 2008; Van de Walle and 
Scott, 2009). However, this is an area in need 
of research as available evidence about the 
causal relationship between service provision 
and state-building is limited (Ndaruhutse et 
al., 2012). Mcloughlin (2012)
 stresses how failure to deliver basic services 
such as security, health, education and justice 
is both a cause of fragility and a characteristic 
of fragile states. The consequences of fragility 
for service delivery are well documented 
and include inequitable coverage of services 
provided to populations, and breakdown of 
accountability (World Bank, 2004).
LEGITIMACY
Sources of legitimacy include: (i) performance/
output legitimacy that can, for example, arise 
from effective and equitable service delivery 
(showing again how the domains connect); 
(ii) legitimacy derived from socially accepted 
beliefs about the rightful source of authority; 
(iii) input/process legitimacy, for example, 
from the constitutional rule of law and/
or appropriate accountability mechanisms, 
and (iv) legitimacy based on international 
recognition and support (OECD, 2010, 2008). 
If a state can perform its core functions 
well, a virtuous circle may be created as 
the delivery of certain functions reinforces 
citizens’ confidence and trust in the state 
and therefore legitimacy, while at the same 
time legitimacy is necessary to manage state-
society relations and deliver services (Ghani 
et al., 2005). The ten key functions identified 
are by this paper are: legitimate monopoly on 
the means of violence, administrative control, 
management of public finances, investment 
in human capital, delineation of citizen 
rights and duties, provision of infrastructure 
services, formation of the market, 
management of state’s assets, international 
relations, and rule of law. The presence of 
a ‘reasonably well functioning civil service’ 
and the capacity of central and sub-national 
administrative structures is recognized as one 
of the essential elements of legitimacy and 
state-building by the OECD (OECD, 2008). 
The OECD highlights that the link between 
the presence of civil servants (such as health 
staff) and legitimacy of the state runs both 
ways: while the presence of capable civil 
servants is essential to ensure the functioning 
of public administration and service provision, 
their presence is not conceivable in the total 
absence of state legitimacy. 
SECURITY
Conflict is a core characteristic of many fragile 
states (hence the use of the common acronym 
FCAS) as conflict undermines delivery 
of all three core domains whose absence 
constitutes fragility. Again, relationships 
run in both directions, as fragility may also 
lead to or predict conflicts – for example, in 
countries such as Syria, where legitimacy and 
authority was disputed, even though capacity 
to deliver services was high prior to the war. 
Chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social 
tensions, and violence or the legacy of armed 
conflict and civil war are highlighted by the 
IMF as common characteristics of fragility 
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(ILO, 2016). More recently, climate change 
pressures, such as natural resource scarcity, 
land use change, extreme weather events or 
volatile food prices, have become a recognized 
threat to stability too, particularly where 
government and institutions are already 
vulnerable (Rüttinger et al., 2015). 
Poor economic performance is another 
contributory factor, as well as result of 
fragility. On the World Bank’s ‘Harmonised 
list of fragile situations’ for 2017, only eight 
out of 52 fragile states are upper-middle 
income (and none high) (World Bank, 
2017b). All others are low or lower-middle 
income. Moreover, for the 20 countries which 
remained on the fragile states list for the 
entire decade (2007-17), all are low income 
or lower-middle income (Annex 3). 
The role of institutional arrangements is 
also highlighted by the literature on fragile 
states (OECD, 2016), as embodying and 
perhaps preserving the conditions of crisis: 
in economic terms, this could be institutions 
(importantly, property rights) that reinforce 
stagnation or low growth rates, or embody 
extreme inequality (in wealth, in access to land, 
in access to the means to make a living); in 
social terms institutions may embody extreme 
inequality or lack of access altogether to health 
or education; in political terms, institutions 
may entrench exclusionary coalitions in power 
(in ethnic, religious, or perhaps regional 
terms), or extreme factionalism or significantly 
fragmented security organisations. In fragile 
states, statutory institutional arrangements are 
vulnerable to challenges by rival institutional 
systems, be they derived from traditional 
authorities, from communities under 
conditions of stress that see little of the state 
(in terms of security, development or welfare), 
from warlords, or from other non-state power 
brokers. Whilst specifics vary across fragile 
states, the underlying drivers can include a 
combination of ethnic fragmentation, neo-
patrimonial politics, over-reliance of the 
economy on natural resources, conflict and 
corruption (Tayler, 2005).
There is a broad literature on the drivers of 
vulnerability and fragility, and a recent surge 
in interest in the notion of resilience, which 
can be conceptualised as opposed to fragility. 
While it remains contested, there is some 
convergence in the resilience literature on 
systems which are able to respond effectively 
to acute shocks, such as conflict, natural 
disasters or epidemics (Witter et al., 2017), 
or everyday stressors (Gilson et al., 2017). 
The absorptive, adaptive and transformative 
capacities which underlie resilience require 
legitimate and effective institutions (Blanchet 
et al., 2017), amongst other features. 
TYPOLOGIES 
While the number of states or territories (for 
example, internationally unrecognised areas 
such as the West Bank and Gaza) varies from 
year to year, and list to list, the core group 
has been made up of 35-55 countries. There 
is substantial overlap between the lists, and 
a core of countries (Afghanistan, Angola, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, 
Niger, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan) that 
appear on many or all (Witter, 2012). As some 
authors point out, the fragile states group 
encompasses very different groupings of 
countries. It includes countries with repressive 
governments (Myanmar, Zimbabwe), poor 
governance (Chad, Nigeria), localized conflict 
(Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Uganda), chronic 
ethnic unrest (Ethiopia), and economic crisis 
(Burundi, Tajikistan). In most instances, the 
various aspects of fragility are intertwined 
(Pavignani and Colombo, 2009).
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Analysis can also be focused on regions 
(regions with vulnerability to spill-overs of 
conflict and fragility from neighbours, for 
example in the Middle East at present) or on 
sub-national levels, recognising that within 
a fragile state there are often islands of 
stability, where recognised local authorities 
are providing essential services, including 
security. 
Some studies have used proxy measures for 
each of the three domains and have classified 
countries according to which combination 
of gaps (legitimacy, security, capacity) they 
exhibit (Figure 9) (Call, 2011). Clearly those 
countries with all three deficits face the most 
intractable challenges of fragility.
States of fragility are dynamic, although, as 
highlighted above, challenging the drivers of 
vulnerability can be challenging. One study 
which classified fragile states and tracked 
them found that 108 out of 131 countries 
did not change categories over 2000-2010 
(Tikuisis et al., 2015).
The DAC’s typology for describing fragile states 
is: (1) deteriorating state, (2) collapsed state, 
and (3) state recovering from conflict. Some 
analysts further segment the third category 
Capacity gap:
Weak states
Legitimacy gap:
Representative autocracies 
Security gap:
War-torn states
Figure 9:	Intersecting	gaps	of	statehood
Source: (Call, 2011)
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into post-conflict and early recovery stages 
(OECD, 2005). Others divide the post-conflict 
period into: emergency and stabilization (0-11 
months post-armed conflict); tran sition and 
recovery (12-47 months after the cessation of 
war); and peace and development (4-10 years 
post-armed conflict) (Ahonsi, 2010).
The World Bank LICUS group have been 
classified into four typologies: (1) prolonged 
crisis or impasse (e.g. Myanmar, Somalia, 
Zimbabwe); (2) post-conflict or political 
transition (e.g. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Liberia, Southern Sudan); (3) 
gradual improvement (e.g. Cambodia); or (4) 
deteriorating governance (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire). 
Each year the lists are revised, so fragility is a 
temporary status (AHSR, 2008).
The Global Fund has adopted the term 
‘challenging operating environments’ 
(COEs) (GFATM, 2016)
 – a typology more focused on the operational 
challenges to engagement by external 
actors and therefore arguably less political. 
Countries in this typology are grouped into 
those facing acute instability, those facing 
chronic instability with weak health systems, 
and those facing chronic instability with 
stronger health systems (Pearson et al., 2014).
Post-conflict is a simpler concept: a country 
or area is considered to be post-conflict when 
active conflict ceases and there is a political 
transformation to a recognized post-conflict 
government (Canavan et al., 2008). The 
transition to post-conflict status is however 
not linear, as political settlements often take 
years, and about 40% of countries collapse 
back into conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). 
Poorer countries are more likely to be affected 
by conflict and are also more likely to relapse 
into conflict (Kruk et al., 2010a).
Pre-conflict is harder to assess but the 
‘fragile states index’, produced by the Fund 
for Peace (The Fund for Peace, 2018), is one 
of the several attempts to do this, assessing 
vulnerability to collapse or conflict using 12 
indicators – social (four), economic (two) and 
political (six). Using these, all recognized states 
are graded as sustainable, moderate (risk), 
warning or alert. Crisis Watch also provides 
regular updates on changes in conflicts and 
risk of conflict globally (International Crisis 
Group, 2018). 
Other terms are used which substantially 
overlap with FCAS, such as ‘disrupted’ 
states or systems, protracted crises 
(Pavignani and Colombo, 2009), systems 
under stress and complex emergencies. 
Complex emergencies can be defined as 
situations where conflict or acute shocks 
co-occur with multiple additional, and often 
intractable, demographic, environmental, 
economic, and social instabilities. The 
term ‘complex emergency,’ though, is also 
used by humanitarian agencies to describe 
conflicts where the ‘complexity’ necessitates 
intervention by multiple agencies (The Robert 
S. Stauss Center, n.d.). 
Although there is a group of countries that 
most observers would confidently classify 
as ‘FCAS’, there is a much greater number 
that demonstrate some, but not all of the 
characteristics of “fragility”. 
  The OECD (OECD 2016) assesses fragile 
or extremely fragile contexts using five 
dimensions (economic, environment, 
political, security, and societal). A context 
may be moderately fragile when it comes 
to security, but extremely fragile in 
political and societal aspects; 56 contexts 
are characterized by the OECD as either 
“extremely fragile” (high fragility in all 
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of the five dimensions noted above as 
well as widespread armed conflict or very 
significant levels of collective violence) 
or “fragile” (fragility in all of the five 
dimensions except low violence). In 
summary the OECD writes that states are 
fragile when its “….structures lack political 
will and/or capacity to provide the basic 
functions needed for poverty reduction, 
development, or safeguarding the security 
and human rights of their populations.” 
  The World Bank (2018) has published 
the Harmonized List of Fragile Situations 
since 2011 with the 2018 list including 
36 situations, from Afghanistan and 
Eritrea to DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Kosovo and 
Myanmar; several countries with from 
sub-national conflicts, or other factors 
which affect fragility, are not on the list 
because they neither have a Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) score below the cut-off (3.200) 
nor a peacekeeping or political/peace-
building mission.
  The UK Aid Strategy (2015) provides a 
list of 54 fragile states, distinguishing 
between “high fragility” e.g. Afghanistan, 
Eritrea, and North Korea, “moderate 
fragility” eg. Angola, Azerbaijan, Kenya 
and Kyrgyzstan, and “low fragility” 
e.g. Djibouti, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania 
and Ukraine. In addition, ten countries, 
including Armenia, Jordan and Tanzania, 
were listed as “neighbouring ‘high 
fragility’ states”. 
  Though not conceptualised around 
fragility, WHO grades emergencies into 
three categories based on the extent, 
complexity and duration of organizational 
and or external support required. The 
grading of an emergency triggers WHO’s 
Emergency Response Procedures and 
emergency policies, and prompts all WHO 
offices at all levels to repurpose resources 
in order to provide support: http://www.
who.int/hac/donorinfo/g3_contributions/
en/
  The g7+ has embarked on its very own 
index for measuring state fragility, 
identifying five clusters (political 
legitimacy, justice, security, economic 
foundation, revenue and services), which 
are located on a fragility- ”spectrum” 
containing five stages. Main differences 
to other indices are constituted by 
privileged role of individual, state-specific 
characteristics and self- rather than 
external assessment. There are currently 
20 member countries: Afghanistan, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, 
São Tomé e Príncipe, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, 
Timor-Leste, Togo and Yemen.
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Table 15: FCAS	countries
LICUS (low-income 
countries under stress) Harmonized list of fragile situations
fcas_
chronic*
fcas_
conflict
2016**2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Afghanistan severe core core Core yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Angola Core core core Core yes Yes yes yes
Bosnia	&	
Herzegovina
yes Yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Burundi core core core Core yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Cameroon marg marg  
CAR severe core core Core yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes Yes
Cambodia marg marg marg
Chad core core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Comores severe core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Congo Rep core core core Core yes yes yes yes Yes
Cote	d’Ivoire severe core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Djibouti marg marg marg marg yes  
DRC core core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Eritrea core core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Gambia,	The marg marg marg marg yes yes  
Georgia Yes yes yes  
Guinea core core core Core yes yes yes Yes
Guinea-
Bissau
core core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Haiti core core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Iraq yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes Yes
Kiribati marg marg Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Kosovo core core core marg yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Lao PDR core marg marg  
Lebanon yes yes  
Liberia severe core core Core yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Libya yes yes yes yes yes Yes Yes
Madagascar yes yes yes yes  
Malawi yes  
Mali yes yes yes yes  
Mauritania marg
ANNEX 3:  
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Table 15: Contd.
LICUS (low-income 
countries under stress) Harmonized list of fragile situations
fcas_
chronic*
fcas_
conflict
2016**2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Marshall	
Islands
Yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Micronesia Yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Myanmar severe core core Core yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Nigeria marg  
Nepal yes Yes yes yes  
Pakistan yes	
Palestine 
(West	Bank	
&	Gaza)
severe core core Core yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Papua	New	
Guinea
marg marg yes  
Sao Tome 
and	Principe
marg core core Core yes  
Sierra Leone marg marg marg marg yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Solomon 
Islands
core core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Somalia severe core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
South	Sudan yes yes yes yes yes yes	 yes
Sudan core core core Core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Syria yes yes yes yes yes yes	 Yes
Tajikistan marg marg yes  
Timor Leste core core core core yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Togo severe core core core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Tonga core core core marg  
Tuvalu yes yes yes yes yes  
Uzbekistan core core marg  
Vanuatu marg marg  
Yemen marg marg yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes Yes
Zimbabwe severe core core core yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Yes
Pakistan
Not	included	in	WB’s	FCAS	classification,	but	included	in	literature	review	as	the	country/areas	are/were	considered	
fragile	or	conflict-affected	(Pakistan	also	included	in	the	OECD	classification,	fcas_conflict2016).
Rwanda
Uganda 
(northern)
Ukraine
Note: All countries included in the World Bank list (World Bank, 2017b) for at least one year in the 2007-2017 period are included in the 
literature review. The gray-shaded area indicates countries considered FCAS for the quantitative analysis (included in the FCAS list at 
least once between 2012 and 2014).
* Countries featuring in the list for 5 or more consecutive years in the 2007-2017 period
** Countries in groups A and B of the security dimension in OECD 2016 ‘States of fragility’ report (OECD, 2016).
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PRIMARY ANALYSIS: COUNTRIES FROM HARMONISED LIST 
THAT ARE FCAS VERSUS ALL OTHERS 
ANNEX 4:  
TREND ANALYSIS
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BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION (COUNTRIES FROM HARMONISED 
LIST THAT ARE FCAS VERSUS ALL OTHERS) 
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